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Message-Id: <20180706151649.31119-1-jannh@google.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Jul 2018 17:16:49 +0200
From: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
To: Stefan Richter <stefanr@...6.in-berlin.de>, jannh@...gle.com
Cc: linux1394-devel@...ts.sourceforge.net, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] firewire: nosy: don't read packets bigger than requested
In general, accessing userspace memory beyond the length of the supplied
buffer in VFS read/write handlers can lead to both kernel memory corruption
(via kernel_read()/kernel_write(), which can e.g. be triggered via
sys_splice()) and privilege escalation inside userspace.
Fixes: 286468210d83 ("firewire: new driver: nosy - IEEE 1394 traffic sniffer")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
---
No CC stable because this device shouldn't be available to unprivileged
code by default and should be pretty rare.
drivers/firewire/nosy.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/firewire/nosy.c b/drivers/firewire/nosy.c
index a128dd1126ae..732075fc312e 100644
--- a/drivers/firewire/nosy.c
+++ b/drivers/firewire/nosy.c
@@ -161,11 +161,12 @@ packet_buffer_get(struct client *client, char __user *data, size_t user_length)
if (atomic_read(&buffer->size) == 0)
return -ENODEV;
- /* FIXME: Check length <= user_length. */
-
end = buffer->data + buffer->capacity;
length = buffer->head->length;
+ if (length > user_length)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (&buffer->head->data[length] < end) {
if (copy_to_user(data, buffer->head->data, length))
return -EFAULT;
--
2.18.0.399.gad0ab374a1-goog
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