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Message-Id: <20180710180123.56461-2-mark.rutland@arm.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2018 19:01:22 +0100
From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
To: linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: catalin.marinas@....com, christoffer.dall@....com,
kvmarm@...ts.cs.columbia.edu, marc.zyngier@....com,
mark.rutland@....com, will.deacon@....com
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] arm64: fix possible spectre-v1 write in ptrace_hbp_set_event()
It's possible for userspace to control idx. Sanitize idx when using it
as an array index, to inhibit the potential spectre-v1 write gadget.
Found by smatch.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
---
arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 19 +++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
index 5c338ce5a7fa..db5440339ab3 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -277,19 +277,22 @@ static int ptrace_hbp_set_event(unsigned int note_type,
switch (note_type) {
case NT_ARM_HW_BREAK:
- if (idx < ARM_MAX_BRP) {
- tsk->thread.debug.hbp_break[idx] = bp;
- err = 0;
- }
+ if (idx >= ARM_MAX_BRP)
+ goto out;
+ idx = array_index_nospec(idx, ARM_MAX_BRP);
+ tsk->thread.debug.hbp_break[idx] = bp;
+ err = 0;
break;
case NT_ARM_HW_WATCH:
- if (idx < ARM_MAX_WRP) {
- tsk->thread.debug.hbp_watch[idx] = bp;
- err = 0;
- }
+ if (idx >= ARM_MAX_WRP)
+ goto out;
+ idx = array_index_nospec(idx, ARM_MAX_WRP);
+ tsk->thread.debug.hbp_watch[idx] = bp;
+ err = 0;
break;
}
+out:
return err;
}
--
2.11.0
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