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Message-ID: <87d0vuao1n.fsf@wylie.me.uk>
Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2018 20:28:04 +0100
From: alan@...ie.me.uk (Alan J. Wylie)
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
catalin.marinas@....com, christoffer.dall@....com,
kvmarm@...ts.cs.columbia.edu, marc.zyngier@....com,
will.deacon@....com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] arm64: spectre-v1 write fixes (CVE-2018-3693)
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com> writes:
> These patches inhibit spectre-v1-write gadgets found in arch/arm64, using the
> same mitigation applied to existing spectre-v1-read gadgets.
>
> This issue is also known as CVE-2018-3693, or "bounds check bypass store".
> More details can be found in the Arm Cache Speculation Side-channels
> whitepaper, available from the Arm security updates site [1].
> [1] https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability
>From that web page:
| Variant 1: bounds check bypass store (CVE-2017-5753) and bounds check
| bypass store (CVE-2018-3693)
Isn't -5753 a "read" vulnerability, not "store"?
--
Alan J. Wylie https://www.wylie.me.uk/
Dance like no-one's watching. / Encrypt like everyone is.
Security is inversely proportional to convenience
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