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Message-Id: <20180710180607.56624-1-mark.rutland@arm.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2018 19:06:07 +0100
From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>
Subject: [PATCH] perf/core: fix possible spectre-v1 write
It's possible for userspace to control event_id. Sanitize event_id when
using it as an array index, to inhibit the potential spectre-v1 write
gadget.
This class of issue is also known as CVE-2018-3693, or "bounds check bypass
store".
Found by smatch.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>
---
kernel/events/core.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
For Arm CPUs, more details can be found in the Arm Cache Speculation
Side-channels whitepaper, available from the Arm security updates site [1].
Mark.
[1] https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 8f0434a9951a..eece719bd18e 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -8155,6 +8155,7 @@ struct static_key perf_swevent_enabled[PERF_COUNT_SW_MAX];
static void sw_perf_event_destroy(struct perf_event *event)
{
u64 event_id = event->attr.config;
+ event_id = array_index_nospec(event_id, PERF_COUNT_SW_MAX);
WARN_ON(event->parent);
@@ -8186,6 +8187,7 @@ static int perf_swevent_init(struct perf_event *event)
if (event_id >= PERF_COUNT_SW_MAX)
return -ENOENT;
+ event_id = array_index_nospec(event_id, PERF_COUNT_SW_MAX);
if (!event->parent) {
int err;
--
2.11.0
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