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Message-ID: <b0a92a2f-cf14-c976-9fbd-fd9aa4ebcf96@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2018 07:05:36 -0700
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@...temov.name>,
Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, x86@...nel.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@...ux.intel.com>,
Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@...ux.intel.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org
Subject: Re: [PATCHv5 05/19] mm/page_alloc: Handle allocation for encrypted
memory
On 07/19/2018 01:27 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>> What other code might need prep_encrypted_page()?
>
> Custom pages allocators if these pages can end up in encrypted VMAs.
>
> It this case compaction creates own pool of pages to be used for
> allocation during page migration.
OK, that makes sense. It also sounds like some great information to add
near prep_encrypted_page().
Do we have any ability to catch cases like this if we get them wrong, or
will we just silently corrupt data?
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