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Message-ID: <20180724120133.GD26036@amd>
Date: Tue, 24 Jul 2018 14:01:33 +0200
From: Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>
To: Yu Chen <yu.c.chen@...el.com>
Cc: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@...e.com>,
"Rafael J . Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@...el.com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>,
"Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@...e.com>, Theodore Ts o <tytso@....edu>,
Stephan Mueller <smueller@...onox.de>,
Denis Kenzior <denkenz@...il.com>, linux-pm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
"Gu, Kookoo" <kookoo.gu@...el.com>,
"Zhang, Rui" <rui.zhang@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4][RFC v2] Introduce the in-kernel hibernation
encryption
Hi!
> > > > "There have some functions be locked-down because
> > > > there have no appropriate mechanisms to check the
> > > > integrity of writing data."
> > > > https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10476751/
> > >
> > > So your goal is to make hibernation compatible with kernel
> > > lockdown? Do your patches provide sufficient security that hibernation
> > > can be enabled with kernel lockdown?
> >
> > OK, maybe I am dense, but if the key comes from user space, will that
> > be enough?
> >
> Good point, we once tried to generate key in kernel, but people
> suggest to generate key in userspace and provide it to the
> kernel, which is what ecryptfs do currently, so it seems this
> should also be safe for encryption in kernel.
Safe against what kind of attack? Please describe what kind of
security you are trying to provide.
I don't think generating key in userspace is good enough for providing
guarantees for secure-boot.
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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