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Message-ID: <AM5PR0401MB2660B8C1DD5ED9989239EF009E550@AM5PR0401MB2660.eurprd04.prod.outlook.com>
Date:   Tue, 24 Jul 2018 12:31:22 +0000
From:   Udit Agarwal <udit.agarwal@....com>
To:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        "dhowells@...hat.com" <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        "zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com" <zohar@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
        "jmorris@...ei.org" <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "serge@...lyn.com" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        "linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org" <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
        "keyrings@...r.kernel.org" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org" 
        <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
CC:     Sahil Malhotra <sahil.malhotra@....com>,
        Ruchika Gupta <ruchika.gupta@....com>,
        Horia Geanta <horia.geanta@....com>,
        Aymen Sghaier <aymen.sghaier@....com>
Subject: RE: [PATCH 1/2] security/keys/secure_key: Adds the secure key support
 based on CAAM.

> On Fri, 2018-07-20 at 11:16 +0530, Udit Agarwal wrote:
> > Secure keys are derieved using CAAM crypto block.
> >
> > Secure keys derieved are the random number symmetric keys from CAAM.
> > Blobs corresponding to the key are formed using CAAM. User space will
> > only be able to view the blob of the key.
> 
> The term "trusted keys" comes from the usage of the Trusted Platform Module
> (TPM).  The term "trusted" now also refers to keyrings, which has nothing to do with a
> TPM.
> 
> What is the correlation between the term "secure keys" and CAAM?  Are "secure keys", as
> defined in this patch, limited to a specific HW crypto device?
> 
> Mimi
> 

Yes the secure keys and CAAM are correlated. Secure keys depends on NXP CAAM crypto HW
accelerator. Secure key is a random data of length X (passed using keyctl command) & derived
using CAAM. Blob of this data is also created using CAAM. Only blob is visible to user space.

Regards,
Udit 

> >
> > Signed-off-by: Udit Agarwal <udit.agarwal@....com>
> > Reviewed-by: Sahil Malhotra <sahil.malhotra@....com>
> > ---
> >  Documentation/security/keys/secure-key.rst |  67 +++
> >  MAINTAINERS                                |  11 +
> >  include/keys/secure-type.h                 |  33 ++
> >  security/keys/Kconfig                      |  11 +
> >  security/keys/Makefile                     |   3 +
> >  security/keys/secure_key.c                 | 339 ++++++++++++
> >  security/keys/securekey_desc.c             | 606 +++++++++++++++++++++
> >  security/keys/securekey_desc.h             | 141 +++++
> >  8 files changed, 1211 insertions(+)
> >  create mode 100644 Documentation/security/keys/secure-key.rst
> >  create mode 100644 include/keys/secure-type.h  create mode 100644
> > security/keys/secure_key.c  create mode 100644
> > security/keys/securekey_desc.c  create mode 100644
> > security/keys/securekey_desc.h
> >
> > diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/secure-key.rst
> > b/Documentation/security/keys/secure-key.rst
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..0fc3367b00f8
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/Documentation/security/keys/secure-key.rst
> > @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
> > +==========
> > +Secure Key
> > +==========
> > +
> > +Secure key is the new type added to kernel key ring service.
> > +Secure key is a symmetric type key of minimum length 32 bytes and
> > +with maximum possible length to be 128 bytes. It is produced in
> > +kernel using the CAAM crypto engine. Userspace can only see the blob
> > +for the corresponding key. All the blobs are displayed or loaded in
> > +hex ascii.
> > +
> > +Secure key can only be created on platforms which supports CAAM
> > +hardware block. Secure key can also be used as a master key to create
> > +the encrypted keys along with the existing key types in kernel.
> > +
> > +Secure key uses CAAM hardware to generate the key and blobify its
> > +content for userspace. Generated blobs are tied up with the hardware
> > +secret key stored in CAAM, hence the same blob will not be able to
> > +de-blobify with the different secret key on another machine.
> > +
> > +Usage::
> > +
> > +	keyctl add secure <name> "new <keylen>" <ring>
> > +	keyctl load secure <name> "load <hex_blob>" <ring>
> > +	keyctl print <key_id>
> > +
> > +"keyctl add secure" option will create the random data of the
> > +specified key len using CAAM and store it as a key in kernel.
> > +Key contents will be displayed as blobs to the user in hex ascii.
> > +User can input key len from 32 bytes to 128 bytes.
> > +
> > +"keyctl load secure" option will load the blob contents. In kernel,
> > +key will be deirved using input blob and CAAM, along with the secret
> > +key stored in CAAM.
> > +
> > +"keyctl print" will return the hex string of the blob corresponding
> > +to key_id. Returned blob will be of key_len + 48 bytes. Extra 48
> > +bytes are the header bytes added by the CAAM.
> > +
> > +Example of secure key usage::
> > +
> > +1. Create the secure key with name kmk-master of length 32 bytes::
> > +
> > +	$ keyctl add secure kmk-master "new 32" @u
> > +	46001928
> > +
> > +	$keyctl show
> > +	Session Keyring
> > +	1030783626 --alswrv      0 65534  keyring: _uid_ses.0
> > +	 695927745 --alswrv      0 65534   \_ keyring: _uid.0
> > +	  46001928 --als-rv      0     0       \_ secure: kmk-master
> > +
> > +2. Print the blob contents for the kmk-master key::
> > +
> > +	$ keyctl print 46001928
> > +	d9743445b640f3d59c1670dddc0bc9c2
> > +	34fc9aab7dd05c965e6120025012f029b
> > +	07faa4776c4f6ed02899e35a135531e9a
> > +	6e5c2b51132f9d5aef28f68738e658296
> > +	3fe583177cfe50d2542b659a13039
> > +
> > +	$ keyctl pipe 46001928 > secure_key.blob
> > +
> > +3. Load the blob in the user key ring::
> > +
> > +	$ keyctl load secure kmk-master "load 'cat secure_key.blob'" @u
> > diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS index
> > 9fd5e8808208..654be2ee4b0a 100644
> > --- a/MAINTAINERS
> > +++ b/MAINTAINERS
> > @@ -7939,6 +7939,17 @@ F:	include/keys/trusted-type.h
> >  F:	security/keys/trusted.c
> >  F:	security/keys/trusted.h
> >
> > +KEYS-SECURE
> > +M:	Udit Agarwal <udit.agarwal@....com>
> > +R:	Sahil Malhotra <sahil.malhotra@....com>
> > +L:	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
> > +L:	keyrings@...r.kernel.org
> > +S:	Supported
> > +F:	include/keys/secure-type.h
> > +F:	security/keys/secure_key.c
> > +F:	security/keys/securekey_desc.c
> > +F:	security/keys/securekey_desc.h
> > +
> >  KEYS/KEYRINGS:
> >  M:	David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
> >  L:	keyrings@...r.kernel.org
> > diff --git a/include/keys/secure-type.h b/include/keys/secure-type.h
> > new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5b7a5f144e41
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/include/keys/secure-type.h
> > @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
> > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> > +/*
> > + * Copyright (C) 2018 NXP.
> > + *
> > + */
> > +
> > +#ifndef _KEYS_SECURE_TYPE_H
> > +#define _KEYS_SECURE_TYPE_H
> > +
> > +#include <linux/key.h>
> > +#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
> > +
> > +/* Minimum key size to be used is 32 bytes and maximum key size fixed
> > + * is 128 bytes.
> > + * Blob size to be kept is Maximum key size + blob header added by CAAM.
> > + */
> > +
> > +#define MIN_KEY_SIZE                    32
> > +#define MAX_KEY_SIZE                    128
> > +#define BLOB_HEADER_SIZE		48
> > +
> > +#define MAX_BLOB_SIZE                   (MAX_KEY_SIZE + BLOB_HEADER_SIZE)
> > +
> > +struct secure_key_payload {
> > +	struct rcu_head rcu;
> > +	unsigned int key_len;
> > +	unsigned int blob_len;
> > +	unsigned char key[MAX_KEY_SIZE + 1];
> > +	unsigned char blob[MAX_BLOB_SIZE];
> > +};
> > +
> > +extern struct key_type key_type_secure; #endif
> > diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig index
> > 6462e6654ccf..7eb138b5a54f 100644
> > --- a/security/keys/Kconfig
> > +++ b/security/keys/Kconfig
> > @@ -71,6 +71,17 @@ config TRUSTED_KEYS
> >
> >  	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
> >
> > +config SECURE_KEYS
> > +	tristate "SECURE_KEYS"
> > +	depends on KEYS && CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM &&
> CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_JR
> > +	help
> > +	  This option provide support for creating secure-type key and blobs
> > +	  in kernel. Secure keys are random number symmetric keys generated
> > +	  from CAAM. The CAAM creates the blobs for the random key.
> > +	  Userspace will only be able to see the blob.
> > +
> > +	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
> > +
> >  config ENCRYPTED_KEYS
> >  	tristate "ENCRYPTED KEYS"
> >  	depends on KEYS
> > diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile index
> > ef1581b337a3..606ba4efb9e6 100644
> > --- a/security/keys/Makefile
> > +++ b/security/keys/Makefile
> > @@ -28,4 +28,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_KEY_DH_OPERATIONS) += dh.o  #
> >  obj-$(CONFIG_BIG_KEYS) += big_key.o
> >  obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o
> > +ccflags-$(CONFIG_SECURE_KEYS) += -I$(obj)/../../drivers/crypto/caam/
> > +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURE_KEYS) += securekey_desc.o
> > +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURE_KEYS) += secure_key.o
> >  obj-$(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS) += encrypted-keys/ diff --git
> > a/security/keys/secure_key.c b/security/keys/secure_key.c new file
> > mode 100644 index 000000000000..ec8ad4394549
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/security/keys/secure_key.c
> > @@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
> > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> > +/* Copyright (C) 2018 NXP
> > + * Secure key is generated using NXP CAAM hardware block. CAAM
> > +generates the
> > + * random number (used as a key) and creates its blob for the user.
> > + */
> > +
> > +#include <linux/slab.h>
> > +#include <linux/parser.h>
> > +#include <linux/string.h>
> > +#include <linux/key-type.h>
> > +#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
> > +#include <keys/secure-type.h>
> > +#include <linux/completion.h>
> > +
> > +#include "securekey_desc.h"
> > +
> > +static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha1)"; static const char
> > +hash_alg[] = "sha1";
> > +
> > +static struct crypto_shash *hashalg;
> > +static struct crypto_shash *hmacalg;
> > +
> > +enum {
> > +	error = -1,
> > +	new_key,
> > +	load_blob,
> > +};
> > +
> > +static const match_table_t key_tokens = {
> > +	{new_key, "new"},
> > +	{load_blob, "load"},
> > +	{error, NULL}
> > +};
> > +
> > +static struct secure_key_payload *secure_payload_alloc(struct key
> > +*key) {
> > +	struct secure_key_payload *sec_key = NULL;
> > +	int ret = 0;
> > +
> > +	ret = key_payload_reserve(key, sizeof(*sec_key));
> > +	if (ret < 0)
> > +		goto out;
> > +
> > +	sec_key = kzalloc(sizeof(*sec_key), GFP_KERNEL);
> > +	if (!sec_key)
> > +		goto out;
> > +
> > +out:
> > +	return sec_key;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * parse_inputdata - parse the keyctl input data and fill in the
> > + *		     payload structure for key or its blob.
> > + * param[in]: data pointer to the data to be parsed for creating key.
> > + * param[in]: p pointer to secure key payload structure to fill
> > +parsed data
> > + * On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL.
> > + */
> > +static int parse_inputdata(char *data, struct secure_key_payload *p)
> > +{
> > +	substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
> > +	long keylen = 0;
> > +	int ret = -EINVAL;
> > +	int key_cmd = -EINVAL;
> > +	char *c = NULL;
> > +
> > +	c = strsep(&data, " \t");
> > +	if (!c) {
> > +		ret = -EINVAL;
> > +		goto out;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	/* Get the keyctl command i.e. new_key or load_blob etc */
> > +	key_cmd = match_token(c, key_tokens, args);
> > +
> > +	switch (key_cmd) {
> > +	case new_key:
> > +		/* first argument is key size */
> > +		c = strsep(&data, " \t");
> > +		if (!c) {
> > +			ret = -EINVAL;
> > +			goto out;
> > +		}
> > +
> > +		ret = kstrtol(c, 10, &keylen);
> > +		if (ret < 0 || keylen < MIN_KEY_SIZE ||
> > +						keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) {
> > +			ret = -EINVAL;
> > +			goto out;
> > +		}
> > +
> > +		p->key_len = keylen;
> > +		ret = new_key;
> > +
> > +		break;
> > +	case load_blob:
> > +		/* first argument is blob data for CAAM*/
> > +		c = strsep(&data, " \t");
> > +		if (!c) {
> > +			ret = -EINVAL;
> > +			goto out;
> > +		}
> > +
> > +		/* Blob_len = No of characters in blob/2 */
> > +		p->blob_len = strlen(c) / 2;
> > +		if (p->blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) {
> > +			ret = -EINVAL;
> > +			goto out;
> > +		}
> > +
> > +		ret = hex2bin(p->blob, c, p->blob_len);
> > +		if (ret < 0) {
> > +			ret = -EINVAL;
> > +			goto out;
> > +		}
> > +		ret = load_blob;
> > +
> > +		break;
> > +	case error:
> > +		ret = -EINVAL;
> > +		break;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +out:
> > +	return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * secure_instantiate - create a new secure type key.
> > + * Supports the operation to generate a new key. A random number
> > + * is generated from CAAM as key data and the corresponding red blob
> > + * is formed and stored as key_blob.
> > + * Also supports the operation to load the blob and key is derived
> > +using
> > + * that blob from CAAM.
> > + * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
> > + */
> > +static int secure_instantiate(struct key *key,
> > +		struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) {
> > +	struct secure_key_payload *payload = NULL;
> > +	size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
> > +	char *data = NULL;
> > +	int key_cmd = 0;
> > +	int ret = 0;
> > +	enum sk_req_type sk_op_type;
> > +	struct device *dev = NULL;
> > +
> > +	if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) {
> > +		ret = -EINVAL;
> > +		goto out;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	data = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
> > +	if (!data) {
> > +		ret = -ENOMEM;
> > +		goto out;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	memcpy(data, prep->data, datalen);
> > +	data[datalen] = '\0';
> > +
> > +	payload = secure_payload_alloc(key);
> > +	if (!payload) {
> > +		ret = -ENOMEM;
> > +		goto out;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	/* Allocate caam job ring for operation to be performed from CAAM */
> > +	dev = caam_jr_alloc();
> > +	if (!dev) {
> > +		pr_info("caam_jr_alloc failed\n");
> > +		ret = -ENODEV;
> > +		goto out;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	key_cmd = parse_inputdata(data, payload);
> > +	if (key_cmd < 0) {
> > +		ret = key_cmd;
> > +		goto out;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	switch (key_cmd) {
> > +	case load_blob:
> > +		/*
> > +		 * Red blob decryption to be done for load operation
> > +		 * to derive the key.
> > +		 */
> > +		sk_op_type = sk_red_blob_dec;
> > +		ret = key_deblob(payload, sk_op_type, dev);
> > +		if (ret != 0) {
> > +			pr_info("secure_key: key_blob decap fail (%d)\n", ret);
> > +			goto out;
> > +		}
> > +		break;
> > +	case new_key:
> > +		/* Get Random number from caam of the specified length */
> > +		sk_op_type = sk_get_random;
> > +		ret = caam_get_random(payload, sk_op_type, dev);
> > +		if (ret != 0) {
> > +			pr_info("secure_key: get_random fail (%d)\n", ret);
> > +			goto out;
> > +		}
> > +
> > +		/* Generate red blob of key random bytes with CAAM */
> > +		sk_op_type = sk_red_blob_enc;
> > +		ret = key_blob(payload, sk_op_type, dev);
> > +		if (ret != 0) {
> > +			pr_info("secure_key: key_blob encap fail (%d)\n", ret);
> > +			goto out;
> > +		}
> > +		break;
> > +	default:
> > +		ret = -EINVAL;
> > +		goto out;
> > +	}
> > +out:
> > +	if (data)
> > +		kzfree(data);
> > +	if (dev)
> > +		caam_jr_free(dev);
> > +
> > +	if (!ret)
> > +		rcu_assign_keypointer(key, payload);
> > +	else
> > +		kzfree(payload);
> > +
> > +	return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * secure_read - copy the  blob data to userspace in hex.
> > + * param[in]: key pointer to key struct
> > + * param[in]: buffer pointer to user data for creating key
> > + * param[in]: buflen is the length of the buffer
> > + * On success, return to userspace the secure key data size.
> > + */
> > +static long secure_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer,
> > +			 size_t buflen)
> > +{
> > +	const struct secure_key_payload *p = NULL;
> > +	char *ascii_buf;
> > +	char *bufp;
> > +	int i;
> > +
> > +	p = dereference_key_locked(key);
> > +	if (!p)
> > +		return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > +	if (buffer && buflen >= 2 * p->blob_len) {
> > +		ascii_buf = kmalloc(2 * p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL);
> > +		if (!ascii_buf)
> > +			return -ENOMEM;
> > +
> > +		bufp = ascii_buf;
> > +		for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++)
> > +			bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]);
> > +		if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len) != 0) {
> > +			kzfree(ascii_buf);
> > +			return -EFAULT;
> > +		}
> > +		kzfree(ascii_buf);
> > +	}
> > +	return 2 * p->blob_len;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * secure_destroy - clear and free the key's payload  */ static void
> > +secure_destroy(struct key *key) {
> > +	kzfree(key->payload.data[0]);
> > +}
> > +
> > +struct key_type key_type_secure = {
> > +	.name = "secure",
> > +	.instantiate = secure_instantiate,
> > +	.destroy = secure_destroy,
> > +	.read = secure_read,
> > +};
> > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_secure);
> > +
> > +static void secure_shash_release(void) {
> > +	if (hashalg)
> > +		crypto_free_shash(hashalg);
> > +	if (hmacalg)
> > +		crypto_free_shash(hmacalg);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int __init secure_shash_alloc(void) {
> > +	int ret;
> > +
> > +	hmacalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
> > +	if (IS_ERR(hmacalg)) {
> > +		pr_info("secure_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n",
> > +				hmac_alg);
> > +		return PTR_ERR(hmacalg);
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	hashalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
> > +	if (IS_ERR(hashalg)) {
> > +		pr_info("secure_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n",
> > +				hash_alg);
> > +		ret = PTR_ERR(hashalg);
> > +		goto hashalg_fail;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	return 0;
> > +
> > +hashalg_fail:
> > +	crypto_free_shash(hmacalg);
> > +	return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int __init init_secure_key(void) {
> > +	int ret;
> > +
> > +	ret = secure_shash_alloc();
> > +	if (ret < 0)
> > +		return ret;
> > +
> > +	ret = register_key_type(&key_type_secure);
> > +	if (ret < 0)
> > +		secure_shash_release();
> > +	return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void __exit cleanup_secure_key(void) {
> > +	secure_shash_release();
> > +	unregister_key_type(&key_type_secure);
> > +}
> > +
> > +late_initcall(init_secure_key);
> > +module_exit(cleanup_secure_key);
> > +
> > +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
> > diff --git a/security/keys/securekey_desc.c
> > b/security/keys/securekey_desc.c new file mode 100644 index
> > 000000000000..a4fa811a5753
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/security/keys/securekey_desc.c
> > @@ -0,0 +1,606 @@
> > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> > +/*
> > + * Copyright (C) 2018 NXP
> > + *
> > + */
> > +
> > +#include <keys/secure-type.h>
> > +#include "securekey_desc.h"
> > +
> > +/* key modifier for blob encapsulation & decapsulation descriptor */
> > +u8 key_modifier[] = "SECURE_KEY";
> > +u32 key_modifier_len = 10;
> > +
> > +void caam_sk_rng_desc(struct sk_req *skreq, struct sk_desc *skdesc) {
> > +	struct sk_fetch_rnd_data *fetch_rnd_data = NULL;
> > +	struct random_desc *rnd_desc = NULL;
> > +	size_t len = 0;
> > +	u32 *desc = skreq->hwdesc;
> > +
> > +	init_job_desc(desc, 0);
> > +
> > +	fetch_rnd_data = &skreq->req_u.sk_fetch_rnd_data;
> > +	rnd_desc = &skdesc->dma_u.random_descp;
> > +	len = fetch_rnd_data->key_len;
> > +
> > +	/* command 0x82500000 */
> > +	append_cmd(desc, CMD_OPERATION | OP_TYPE_CLASS1_ALG |
> > +			OP_ALG_ALGSEL_RNG);
> > +	/* command 0x60340000 | len */
> > +	append_cmd(desc, CMD_FIFO_STORE | FIFOST_TYPE_RNGSTORE | len);
> > +	append_ptr(desc, rnd_desc->rnd_data); }
> > +
> > +void caam_sk_redblob_encap_desc(struct sk_req *skreq, struct sk_desc
> > +*skdesc) {
> > +	struct redblob_encap_desc *red_blob_desc =
> > +					&skdesc->dma_u.redblob_encapdesc;
> > +	struct sk_red_blob_encap *red_blob_req =
> > +					&skreq->req_u.sk_red_blob_encap;
> > +	u32 *desc = skreq->hwdesc;
> > +
> > +	init_job_desc(desc, 0);
> > +
> > +	/* Load class 2 key with key modifier. */
> > +	append_key_as_imm(desc, key_modifier, key_modifier_len,
> > +			  key_modifier_len, CLASS_2 | KEY_DEST_CLASS_REG);
> > +
> > +	/* SEQ IN PTR Command. */
> > +	append_seq_in_ptr(desc, red_blob_desc->in_data, red_blob_req->data_sz,
> > +			  0);
> > +
> > +	/* SEQ OUT PTR Command. */
> > +	append_seq_out_ptr(desc, red_blob_desc->redblob,
> > +			   red_blob_req->redblob_sz, 0);
> > +
> > +	/* RedBlob encapsulation PROTOCOL Command. */
> > +	append_operation(desc, OP_TYPE_ENCAP_PROTOCOL | OP_PCLID_BLOB); }
> > +
> > +/* void caam_sk_redblob_decap_desc(struct sk_req *skreq, struct
> > +sk_desc *skdesc)
> > + * brief CAAM Descriptor creator from redblob to plaindata.
> > + * param[in] skreq Pointer to secure key request structure
> > + * param[in] skdesc Pointer to secure key descriptor structure  */
> > +void caam_sk_redblob_decap_desc(struct sk_req *skreq, struct sk_desc
> > +*skdesc) {
> > +	struct redblob_decap_desc *red_blob_desc =
> > +					&skdesc->dma_u.redblob_decapdesc;
> > +	struct sk_red_blob_decap *red_blob_req =
> > +					&skreq->req_u.sk_red_blob_decap;
> > +	u32 *desc = skreq->hwdesc;
> > +
> > +	init_job_desc(desc, 0);
> > +
> > +	/* Load class 2 key with key modifier. */
> > +	append_key_as_imm(desc, key_modifier, key_modifier_len,
> > +			  key_modifier_len, CLASS_2 | KEY_DEST_CLASS_REG);
> > +
> > +	/* SEQ IN PTR Command. */
> > +	append_seq_in_ptr(desc, red_blob_desc->redblob,
> > +			  red_blob_req->redblob_sz, 0);
> > +
> > +	/* SEQ OUT PTR Command. */
> > +	append_seq_out_ptr(desc, red_blob_desc->out_data,
> > +			   red_blob_req->data_sz, 0);
> > +
> > +	/* RedBlob decapsulation PROTOCOL Command. */
> > +	append_operation(desc, OP_TYPE_DECAP_PROTOCOL | OP_PCLID_BLOB); }
> > +
> > +/* int caam_sk_get_random_map(struct device *dev, struct sk_req *req,
> > + *			      struct sk_desc *skdesc)
> > + * brief DMA map the buffer virtual pointers to physical address.
> > + * param[in] dev Pointer to job ring device structure
> > + * param[in] req Pointer to secure key request structure
> > + * param[in] skdesc Pointer to secure key descriptor structure
> > + * return 0 on success, error value otherwise.
> > + */
> > +int caam_sk_get_random_map(struct device *dev, struct sk_req *req,
> > +			   struct sk_desc *skdesc)
> > +{
> > +	struct sk_fetch_rnd_data *fetch_rnd_data;
> > +	struct random_desc *rnd_desc;
> > +
> > +	fetch_rnd_data = &req->req_u.sk_fetch_rnd_data;
> > +	rnd_desc = &skdesc->dma_u.random_descp;
> > +
> > +	rnd_desc->rnd_data = dma_map_single(dev, fetch_rnd_data->data,
> > +				fetch_rnd_data->key_len, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
> > +
> > +	if (dma_mapping_error(dev, rnd_desc->rnd_data)) {
> > +		dev_err(dev, "Unable to map memory\n");
> > +		goto sk_random_map_fail;
> > +	}
> > +	return 0;
> > +
> > +sk_random_map_fail:
> > +	return -ENOMEM;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/* int caam_sk_redblob_encap_map(struct device *dev, struct sk_req *req,
> > + *					struct sk_desc *skdesc)
> > + * brief DMA map the buffer virtual pointers to physical address.
> > + * param[in] dev Pointer to job ring device structure
> > + * param[in] req Pointer to secure key request structure
> > + * param[in] skdesc Pointer to secure key descriptor structure
> > + * return 0 on success, error value otherwise.
> > + */
> > +int caam_sk_redblob_encap_map(struct device *dev, struct sk_req *req,
> > +			      struct sk_desc *skdesc)
> > +{
> > +	struct sk_red_blob_encap *red_blob_encap;
> > +	struct redblob_encap_desc *red_blob_desc;
> > +
> > +	red_blob_encap = &req->req_u.sk_red_blob_encap;
> > +	red_blob_desc = &skdesc->dma_u.redblob_encapdesc;
> > +
> > +	red_blob_desc->in_data = dma_map_single(dev, red_blob_encap->data,
> > +					red_blob_encap->data_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> > +	if (dma_mapping_error(dev, red_blob_desc->in_data)) {
> > +		dev_err(dev, "Unable to map memory\n");
> > +		goto sk_data_fail;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	red_blob_desc->redblob = dma_map_single(dev, red_blob_encap->redblob,
> > +				red_blob_encap->redblob_sz, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
> > +	if (dma_mapping_error(dev, red_blob_desc->redblob)) {
> > +		dev_err(dev, "Unable to map memory\n");
> > +		goto sk_redblob_fail;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	return 0;
> > +
> > +sk_redblob_fail:
> > +	dma_unmap_single(dev, red_blob_desc->in_data, red_blob_encap->data_sz,
> > +			 DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> > +sk_data_fail:
> > +	return -ENOMEM;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/* static int caam_sk_redblob_decap_map(struct device *dev,
> > + *					    struct sk_req *req,
> > + *					    struct sk_desc *skdesc)
> > + * brief DMA map the buffer virtual pointers to physical address.
> > + * param[in] dev Pointer to job ring device structure
> > + * param[in] req Pointer to secure key request structure
> > + * param[in] skdesc Pointer to secure key descriptor structure
> > + * return 0 on success, error value otherwise.
> > + */
> > +int caam_sk_redblob_decap_map(struct device *dev, struct sk_req *req,
> > +			      struct sk_desc *skdesc)
> > +{
> > +	struct sk_red_blob_decap *red_blob_decap;
> > +	struct redblob_decap_desc *red_blob_desc;
> > +
> > +	red_blob_decap = &req->req_u.sk_red_blob_decap;
> > +	red_blob_desc = &skdesc->dma_u.redblob_decapdesc;
> > +
> > +	red_blob_desc->redblob = dma_map_single(dev, red_blob_decap->redblob,
> > +				red_blob_decap->redblob_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> > +	if (dma_mapping_error(dev, red_blob_desc->redblob)) {
> > +		dev_err(dev, "Unable to map memory\n");
> > +		goto sk_redblob_fail;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	red_blob_desc->out_data = dma_map_single(dev, red_blob_decap->data,
> > +				red_blob_decap->data_sz, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
> > +	if (dma_mapping_error(dev, red_blob_desc->out_data)) {
> > +		dev_err(dev, "Unable to map memory\n");
> > +		goto sk_data_fail;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	return 0;
> > +
> > +sk_data_fail:
> > +	dma_unmap_single(dev, red_blob_desc->redblob,
> > +			 red_blob_decap->redblob_sz, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> > +sk_redblob_fail:
> > +	return -ENOMEM;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/* @fn void securekey_unmap(struct device *dev,
> > + *			    struct sk_desc *skdesc, struct sk_req *req)
> > + * @brief DMA unmap the buffer pointers.
> > + * @param[in] dev Pointer to job ring device structure
> > + * @param[in] skdesc Pointer to secure key descriptor structure
> > + * @param[in] req Pointer to secure key request structure  */ void
> > +securekey_unmap(struct device *dev,
> > +		     struct sk_desc *skdesc, struct sk_req *req) {
> > +
> > +	switch (req->type) {
> > +	case sk_get_random:
> > +		{
> > +			struct sk_fetch_rnd_data *fetch_rnd_data;
> > +			struct random_desc *rnd_desc;
> > +
> > +			fetch_rnd_data = &req->req_u.sk_fetch_rnd_data;
> > +			rnd_desc = &skdesc->dma_u.random_descp;
> > +
> > +			/* Unmap Descriptor buffer pointers. */
> > +			dma_unmap_single(dev, rnd_desc->rnd_data,
> > +					 fetch_rnd_data->key_len,
> > +					 DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
> > +			break;
> > +		}
> > +	case sk_red_blob_enc:
> > +		{
> > +			struct sk_red_blob_encap *red_blob_encap;
> > +			struct redblob_encap_desc *red_blob_desc;
> > +
> > +			red_blob_encap = &req->req_u.sk_red_blob_encap;
> > +			red_blob_desc = &skdesc->dma_u.redblob_encapdesc;
> > +
> > +			/* Unmap Descriptor buffer pointers. */
> > +			dma_unmap_single(dev, red_blob_desc->in_data,
> > +					 red_blob_encap->data_sz,
> > +					 DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> > +
> > +			dma_unmap_single(dev, red_blob_desc->redblob,
> > +					 red_blob_encap->redblob_sz,
> > +					 DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
> > +
> > +			break;
> > +		}
> > +	case sk_red_blob_dec:
> > +		{
> > +			struct sk_red_blob_decap *red_blob_decap;
> > +			struct redblob_decap_desc *red_blob_desc;
> > +
> > +			red_blob_decap = &req->req_u.sk_red_blob_decap;
> > +			red_blob_desc = &skdesc->dma_u.redblob_decapdesc;
> > +
> > +			/* Unmap Descriptor buffer pointers. */
> > +			dma_unmap_single(dev, red_blob_desc->redblob,
> > +					 red_blob_decap->redblob_sz,
> > +					 DMA_TO_DEVICE);
> > +
> > +			dma_unmap_single(dev, red_blob_desc->out_data,
> > +					 red_blob_decap->data_sz,
> > +					 DMA_FROM_DEVICE);
> > +
> > +			break;
> > +		}
> > +	default:
> > +		dev_err(dev, "Unable to find request type\n");
> > +		break;
> > +	}
> > +	kfree(skdesc);
> > +}
> > +
> > +/*  int caam_securekey_desc_init(struct device *dev, struct sk_req
> > +*req)
> > + *  brief CAAM Descriptor creator for secure key operations.
> > + *  param[in] dev Pointer to job ring device structure
> > + *  param[in] req Pointer to secure key request structure
> > + *  return 0 on success, error value otherwise.
> > + */
> > +int caam_securekey_desc_init(struct device *dev, struct sk_req *req)
> > +{
> > +	struct sk_desc *skdesc = NULL;
> > +	int ret = 0;
> > +
> > +	switch (req->type) {
> > +	case sk_get_random:
> > +		{
> > +			skdesc = kmalloc(sizeof(*skdesc), GFP_DMA);
> > +			if (!skdesc) {
> > +				ret = -ENOMEM;
> > +				goto out;
> > +			}
> > +			skdesc->req_type = req->type;
> > +
> > +			if (caam_sk_get_random_map(dev, req, skdesc)) {
> > +				dev_err(dev, "caam get_random map fail\n");
> > +				ret = -ENOMEM;
> > +				goto out;
> > +			}
> > +			caam_sk_rng_desc(req, skdesc);
> > +			break;
> > +		}
> > +	case sk_red_blob_enc:
> > +		{
> > +			skdesc = kmalloc(sizeof(*skdesc), GFP_DMA);
> > +			if (!skdesc) {
> > +				ret = -ENOMEM;
> > +				goto out;
> > +			}
> > +
> > +			skdesc->req_type = req->type;
> > +
> > +			if (caam_sk_redblob_encap_map(dev, req, skdesc)) {
> > +				dev_err(dev, "caam redblob_encap map fail\n");
> > +				ret = -ENOMEM;
> > +				goto out;
> > +			}
> > +
> > +			/* Descriptor function to create redblob from data. */
> > +			caam_sk_redblob_encap_desc(req, skdesc);
> > +			break;
> > +		}
> > +
> > +	case sk_red_blob_dec:
> > +		{
> > +			skdesc = kmalloc(sizeof(*skdesc), GFP_DMA);
> > +			if (!skdesc) {
> > +				ret = -ENOMEM;
> > +				goto out;
> > +			}
> > +
> > +			skdesc->req_type = req->type;
> > +
> > +			if (caam_sk_redblob_decap_map(dev, req, skdesc)) {
> > +				dev_err(dev, "caam redblob_decap map fail\n");
> > +				ret = -ENOMEM;
> > +				goto out;
> > +			}
> > +
> > +			/* Descriptor function to decap data from redblob. */
> > +			caam_sk_redblob_decap_desc(req, skdesc);
> > +			break;
> > +		}
> > +	default:
> > +		pr_debug("Unknown request type\n");
> > +		ret = -EINVAL;
> > +		goto out;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	req->desc_pointer = (void *)skdesc;
> > +
> > +out:
> > +	return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/* static void caam_op_done (struct device *dev, u32 *desc, u32 ret,
> > + *			     void *context)
> > + * brief callback function to be called when descriptor executed.
> > + * param[in] dev Pointer to device structure
> > + * param[in] desc descriptor pointer
> > + * param[in] ret return status of Job submitted
> > + * param[in] context void pointer
> > + */
> > +static void caam_op_done(struct device *dev, u32 *desc, u32 ret,
> > +			 void *context)
> > +{
> > +	struct sk_req *req = context;
> > +
> > +	if (ret) {
> > +		dev_err(dev, "caam op done err: %x\n", ret);
> > +		/* print the error source name. */
> > +		caam_jr_strstatus(dev, ret);
> > +	}
> > +	/* Call securekey_unmap function for unmapping the buffer pointers. */
> > +	securekey_unmap(dev, req->desc_pointer, req);
> > +
> > +	req->ret = ret;
> > +	complete(&req->comp);
> > +}
> > +
> > +
> > +/*  static int sk_job_submit(struct device *jrdev, struct sk_req
> > +*req)
> > + *  brief Enqueue a Job descriptor to Job ring and wait until SEC returns.
> > + *  param[in] jrdev Pointer to job ring device structure
> > + *  param[in] req Pointer to secure key request structure
> > + *  return 0 on success, error value otherwise.
> > + */
> > +static int sk_job_submit(struct device *jrdev, struct sk_req *req) {
> > +	int ret;
> > +
> > +	init_completion(&req->comp);
> > +
> > +	/* caam_jr_enqueue function for Enqueue a job descriptor */
> > +	ret = caam_jr_enqueue(jrdev, req->hwdesc, caam_op_done, req);
> > +	if (!ret)
> > +		wait_for_completion_interruptible(&req->comp);
> > +
> > +	ret = req->ret;
> > +	return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/* caam_get_random(struct secure_key_payload *p,  enum sk_req_type fetch_rnd,
> > + *		   struct device *dev)
> > + * Create the random number of the specified length using CAAM block
> > + * param[in]: out pointer to place the random bytes
> > + * param[in]: length for the random data bytes.
> > + * param[in]: dev Pointer to job ring device structure
> > + * If operation is successful return 0, otherwise error.
> > + */
> > +int caam_get_random(struct secure_key_payload *p,  enum sk_req_type fetch_rnd,
> > +		    struct device *dev)
> > +{
> > +	struct sk_fetch_rnd_data *fetch_rnd_data = NULL;
> > +	struct sk_req *req = NULL;
> > +	int ret = 0;
> > +	void *temp = NULL;
> > +
> > +	req = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sk_req), GFP_DMA);
> > +	if (!req) {
> > +		ret = -ENOMEM;
> > +		goto out;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	req->type = fetch_rnd;
> > +	fetch_rnd_data = &(req->req_u.sk_fetch_rnd_data);
> > +
> > +	/* initialise with key length */
> > +	fetch_rnd_data->key_len = p->key_len;
> > +
> > +	temp = kmalloc(fetch_rnd_data->key_len, GFP_DMA);
> > +	if (!temp) {
> > +		ret = -ENOMEM;
> > +		goto out;
> > +	}
> > +	fetch_rnd_data->data = temp;
> > +
> > +	ret = caam_securekey_desc_init(dev, req);
> > +
> > +	if (ret) {
> > +		pr_info("caam_securekey_desc_init failed\n");
> > +		goto out;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	ret = sk_job_submit(dev, req);
> > +	if (!ret) {
> > +		/*Copy output to key buffer. */
> > +		memcpy(p->key, fetch_rnd_data->data, p->key_len);
> > +	} else {
> > +		ret = -EINVAL;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +out:
> > +	if (req)
> > +		kfree(req);
> > +
> > +	if (temp)
> > +		kfree(temp);
> > +
> > +	return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/* key_deblob(struct secure_key_payload *p, enum sk_req_type decap_type
> > + *		struct device *dev)
> > + * Deblobify the blob to get the key data and fill in secure key
> > +payload struct
> > + * param[in] p pointer to the secure key payload
> > + * param[in] decap_type operation to be done.
> > + * param[in] dev dev Pointer to job ring device structure
> > + * If operation is successful return 0, otherwise error.
> > + */
> > +int key_deblob(struct secure_key_payload *p, enum sk_req_type decap_type,
> > +	       struct device *dev)
> > +{
> > +	unsigned int blob_len;
> > +	struct sk_red_blob_decap *d_blob;
> > +	struct sk_req *req = NULL;
> > +	int total_sz = 0, *temp = NULL, ret = 0;
> > +
> > +	req = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sk_req), GFP_DMA);
> > +	if (!req) {
> > +		ret = -ENOMEM;
> > +		goto out;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	d_blob = &(req->req_u.sk_red_blob_decap);
> > +	blob_len = p->blob_len;
> > +	req->type = decap_type;
> > +
> > +	/*
> > +	 * Red blob size is the blob_len filled in payload struct
> > +	 * Data_sz i.e. key is the blob_len - blob header size
> > +	 */
> > +
> > +	d_blob->redblob_sz = blob_len;
> > +	d_blob->data_sz = blob_len - (SK_BLOB_KEY_SZ + SK_BLOB_MAC_SZ);
> > +	total_sz = d_blob->data_sz + d_blob->redblob_sz;
> > +
> > +	temp = kmalloc(total_sz, GFP_DMA);
> > +	if (!temp) {
> > +		ret = -ENOMEM;
> > +		goto out;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	req->mem_pointer = temp;
> > +	d_blob->redblob = temp;
> > +	d_blob->data = d_blob->redblob + d_blob->redblob_sz;
> > +	memcpy(d_blob->redblob, p->blob, blob_len);
> > +
> > +	ret = caam_securekey_desc_init(dev, req);
> > +
> > +	if (ret) {
> > +		pr_info("caam_securekey_desc_init: Failed\n");
> > +		goto out;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	ret = sk_job_submit(dev, req);
> > +	if (!ret) {
> > +		/*Copy output to key buffer. */
> > +		p->key_len = d_blob->data_sz;
> > +		memcpy(p->key, d_blob->data, p->key_len);
> > +	} else {
> > +		ret = -EINVAL;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +out:
> > +	if (temp)
> > +		kfree(temp);
> > +	if (req)
> > +		kfree(req);
> > +	return ret;
> > +}
> > +
> > +/* key_blob(struct secure_key_payload *p, enum sk_req_type encap_type,
> > + *		struct device *dev)
> > + * To blobify the key data to get the blob. This blob can only be
> > +seen by
> > + * userspace.
> > + * param[in] p pointer to the secure key payload
> > + * param[in] decap_type operation to be done.
> > + * param[in] dev dev Pointer to job ring device structure
> > + * If operation is successful return 0, otherwise error.
> > + */
> > +int key_blob(struct secure_key_payload *p, enum sk_req_type encap_type,
> > +	     struct device *dev)
> > +{
> > +	unsigned int key_len;
> > +	struct sk_red_blob_encap *k_blob;
> > +	struct sk_req *req = NULL;
> > +	int total_sz = 0, *temp = NULL, ret = 0;
> > +
> > +	req = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sk_req), GFP_DMA);
> > +	if (!req) {
> > +		ret = -ENOMEM;
> > +		goto out;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	key_len = p->key_len;
> > +
> > +	req->type = encap_type;
> > +	k_blob = &(req->req_u.sk_red_blob_encap);
> > +
> > +	/*
> > +	 * Data_sz i.e. key len and the corresponding blob_len is
> > +	 * key_len + BLOB header size.87ea58433208
> > +	 */
> > +
> > +	k_blob->data_sz = key_len;
> > +	k_blob->redblob_sz = key_len + SK_BLOB_KEY_SZ + SK_BLOB_MAC_SZ;
> > +	total_sz = k_blob->data_sz + k_blob->redblob_sz;
> > +
> > +	temp = kmalloc(total_sz, GFP_DMA);
> > +	if (!temp) {
> > +		ret = -ENOMEM;
> > +		goto out;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	req->mem_pointer = temp;
> > +	k_blob->data = temp;
> > +
> > +	k_blob->redblob = k_blob->data + k_blob->data_sz;
> > +	memcpy(k_blob->data, p->key, key_len);
> > +
> > +	ret = caam_securekey_desc_init(dev, req);
> > +
> > +	if (ret) {
> > +		pr_info("caam_securekey_desc_init failed\n");
> > +		goto out;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	ret = sk_job_submit(dev, req);
> > +	if (!ret) {
> > +		/*Copy output to key buffer. */
> > +		p->blob_len = k_blob->redblob_sz;
> > +		memcpy(p->blob, k_blob->redblob, p->blob_len);
> > +	} else {
> > +		ret = -EINVAL;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +out:
> > +	if (temp)
> > +		kfree(req->mem_pointer);
> > +	if (req)
> > +		kfree(req);
> > +	return ret;
> > +
> > +}
> > +
> > diff --git a/security/keys/securekey_desc.h
> > b/security/keys/securekey_desc.h new file mode 100644 index
> > 000000000000..0ee26e95b205
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/security/keys/securekey_desc.h
> > @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
> > +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
> > +/*
> > + * Copyright 2018 NXP
> > + *
> > + */
> > +#ifndef _SECUREKEY_DESC_H_
> > +#define _SECUREKEY_DESC_H_
> > +
> > +#include "compat.h"
> > +#include "regs.h"
> > +#include "intern.h"
> > +#include "desc.h"
> > +#include "desc_constr.h"
> > +#include "jr.h"
> > +#include "error.h"
> > +#include "pdb.h"
> > +
> > +#define SK_BLOB_KEY_SZ		32	/* Blob key size. */
> > +#define SK_BLOB_MAC_SZ		16	/* Blob MAC size. */
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * brief defines different kinds of operations supported by this module.
> > + */
> > +enum sk_req_type {
> > +	sk_get_random,
> > +	sk_red_blob_enc,
> > +	sk_red_blob_dec,
> > +};
> > +
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * struct random_des
> > + * param[out] rnd_data output buffer for random data.
> > + */
> > +struct random_desc {
> > +	dma_addr_t rnd_data;
> > +};
> > +
> > +/* struct redblob_encap_desc
> > + * details Structure containing dma address for redblob encapsulation.
> > + * param[in] in_data input data to redblob encap descriptor.
> > + * param[out] redblob output buffer for redblob.
> > + */
> > +struct redblob_encap_desc {
> > +	dma_addr_t in_data;
> > +	dma_addr_t redblob;
> > +};
> > +
> > +/* struct redblob_decap_desc
> > + * details Structure containing dma address for redblob decapsulation.
> > + * param[in] redblob input buffer to redblob decap descriptor.
> > + * param[out] out_data output data from redblob decap descriptor.
> > + */
> > +struct redblob_decap_desc {
> > +	dma_addr_t redblob;
> > +	dma_addr_t out_data;
> > +};
> > +
> > +/* struct sk_desc
> > + * details Structure for securekey descriptor creation.
> > + * param[in] req_type operation supported.
> > + * param[in] dma_u union of struct for supported operation.
> > + */
> > +struct sk_desc {
> > +	u32 req_type;
> > +	union {
> > +		struct redblob_encap_desc redblob_encapdesc;
> > +		struct redblob_decap_desc redblob_decapdesc;
> > +		struct random_desc random_descp;
> > +	} dma_u;
> > +};
> > +
> > +/* struct sk_fetch_rnd_data
> > + * decriptor structure containing key length.
> > + */
> > +struct sk_fetch_rnd_data {
> > +	void *data;
> > +	size_t key_len;
> > +};
> > +
> > +/* struct sk_red_blob_encap
> > + * details Structure containing buffer pointers for redblob encapsulation.
> > + * param[in] data Input data.
> > + * param[in] data_sz size of Input data.
> > + * param[out] redblob output buffer for redblob.
> > + * param[in] redblob_sz size of redblob.
> > + */
> > +struct sk_red_blob_encap {
> > +	void *data;
> > +	uint32_t data_sz;
> > +	void *redblob;
> > +	uint32_t redblob_sz;
> > +};
> > +
> > +/* struct sk_red_blob_decap
> > + * details Structure containing buffer pointers for redblob decapsulation.
> > + * param[in] redblob Input redblob.
> > + * param[in] redblob_sz size of redblob.
> > + * param[out] data output buffer for data.
> > + * param[in] data_sz size of output data.
> > + */
> > +struct sk_red_blob_decap {
> > +	void *redblob;
> > +	uint32_t redblob_sz;
> > +	void *data;
> > +	uint32_t data_sz;
> > +};
> > +
> > +/* struct sk_req
> > + * details Structure for securekey request creation.
> > + * param[in] type operation supported.
> > + * param[in] req_u union of struct for supported operation.
> > + * param[out] ret return status of CAAM operation.
> > + * param[in] mem_pointer memory pointer for allocated kernel memory.
> > + * param[in] desc_pointer Pointer to securekey descriptor creation structure.
> > + * param[in] comp struct completion object.
> > + * param[in] hwdesc contains descriptor instructions.
> > + */
> > +struct sk_req {
> > +	enum sk_req_type type;
> > +	void *arg;
> > +	union {
> > +		struct sk_red_blob_encap sk_red_blob_encap;
> > +		struct sk_red_blob_decap sk_red_blob_decap;
> > +		struct sk_fetch_rnd_data sk_fetch_rnd_data;
> > +	} req_u;
> > +	int ret;
> > +	void *mem_pointer;
> > +	void *desc_pointer;
> > +	struct completion comp;
> > +	u32 hwdesc[MAX_CAAM_DESCSIZE];
> > +};
> > +
> > +int caam_get_random(struct secure_key_payload *p,  enum sk_req_type fetch_rnd,
> > +		    struct device *dev);
> > +int key_blob(struct secure_key_payload *p, enum sk_req_type encap_type,
> > +	     struct device *dev);
> > +int key_deblob(struct secure_key_payload *p, enum sk_req_type decap_type,
> > +	       struct device *dev);
> > +
> > +#endif /*_SECUREKEY_DESC_H_*/

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