linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v1 00/22] LSM: Full security module stacking

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Message-ID: <CAMp4zn94SzqK_Q=de2E+Fpv5yeAhYv62XW-KU3=ghRma9d7Jvw@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Tue, 14 Aug 2018 10:05:07 -0700
From:   Sargun Dhillon <sargun@...gun.me>
To:     Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Cc:     LSM <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        LKLM <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
        Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
        SE Linux <selinux@...ho.nsa.gov>,
        "SMACK-discuss@...ts.01.org" <SMACK-discuss@...ts.01.org>,
        John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        "Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 00/22] LSM: Full security module stacking

On Mon, Jul 16, 2018 at 10:53 AM, Casey Schaufler
<casey@...aufler-ca.com> wrote:
> LSM: Full security module stacking
>
> I'm calling this v1 not because it's the first version
> I've put out but because it's the first version I'm getting
> serious external pressure to get upstream.
Awesome work, I'm glad that this is getting further.

>
> The blob management part (through "LSM: Sharing of security blobs")
> is ready for prime-time. These changes move the management of
> security blobs out of the security modules and into the security
> module infrastructure. With this change the proposed S.A.R.A,
> LandLock and PTAGS security modules could co-exist with any of
> the existing "major" security modules. The changes reduce some
> code duplication.
>
> Beyond the blob management there's a bit of clean-up.
> Mounting filesystems had to be changed so that options
> a security module doesn't recognize won't be considered
> a fatal error. The mount infrastructure is somewhat
> more complex than one might assume.
>

Casey,
Do you think you can break out 1 into its own patch? It seems like
that'd be valuable to everyone.


What's your thought here if we ever introduce dynamic security
modules? It's nice that we now have a way around rolling back blobs if
one fails, but what if a new module was activated, would we just
resize the slab cache?