linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] Fix kexec forbidding kernels signed with custom platform keys to boot

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Date:   Wed, 15 Aug 2018 14:14:27 -0700
From:   Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
To:     yannik@...britzki.me
Cc:     Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@...hat.com>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Peter Anvin <hpa@...or.com>,
        "the arch/x86 maintainers" <x86@...nel.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>, Baoquan He <bhe@...hat.com>,
        Justin Forbes <jforbes@...hat.com>,
        Peter Jones <pjones@...hat.com>,
        James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
        Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Fix kexec forbidding kernels signed with custom platform
 keys to boot

On Wed, Aug 15, 2018 at 2:08 PM Yannik Sembritzki <yannik@...britzki.me> wrote:
>
> IMO, this is not okay. The layer of trust should extend from the bottom
> (user-provisioned platform key) up. Only trusting the kernel builtin key
> later on (wrt. kernel modules) contradicts this principal.

This module loading case is not about trusting the *key*.

This is about trusting the *build system*.

For example, I build my kernels with one single randomly generated key
(that gets deleted afterwards). The modules get built with that key
too.

No amount of added keys later will make a module valid to load.

                  Linus