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Date:   Thu, 30 Aug 2018 10:26:00 -0700
From:   Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@...el.com>
To:     Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
Cc:     the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@...nel.org>,
        "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        kernel list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
        Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
        Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>,
        Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
        Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>, hjl.tools@...il.com,
        Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, keescook@...omiun.org,
        Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@...cle.com>,
        Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@...il.com>,
        Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@....cz>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        ravi.v.shankar@...el.com, vedvyas.shanbhogue@...el.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 12/24] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and
 pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW

On Thu, 2018-08-30 at 10:19 -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 08/30/2018 09:23 AM, Jann Horn wrote:
> > 
> > Three threads (A, B, C) run with the same CR3.
> > 
> > 1. a dirty+writable PTE is placed directly in front of B's shadow
> > stack.
> >    (this can happen, right? or is there a guard page?)
> > 2. C's TLB caches the dirty+writable PTE.
> > 3. A performs some syscall that triggers ptep_set_wrprotect().
> > 4. A's syscall calls clear_bit().
> > 5. B's TLB caches the transient shadow stack.
> > [now C has write access to B's transiently-extended shadow stack]
> > 6. B recurses into the transiently-extended shadow stack
> > 7. C overwrites the transiently-extended shadow stack area.
> > 8. B returns through the transiently-extended shadow stack, giving
> >     the attacker instruction pointer control in B.
> > 9. A's syscall broadcasts a TLB flush.
> Heh, that's a good point.  The shadow stack permissions are *not*
> strictly reduced because a page getting marked as shadow-stack has
> *increased* permissions when being used as a shadow stack.  Fun.
> 
> For general hardening, it seems like we want to ensure that there's
> a
> guard page at the bottom of the shadow stack.  Yu-cheng, do we have
> a
> guard page?

We don't have the guard page now, but there is a shadow stack token
there, which cannot be used as a return address.

Yu-cheng

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