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Date: Wed, 5 Sep 2018 20:35:19 +0200 (CEST) From: Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org> To: Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com> cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>, "Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@...el.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>, Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>, "Woodhouse, David" <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] ptrace: Provide ___ptrace_may_access() that can be applied on arbitrary tasks On Wed, 5 Sep 2018, Andi Kleen wrote: > Please if you repost include plenty of performance numbers for multi > threaded workloads. It's ridiculous to even discuss this without them. Talking about ridiculous ... I find it a bit sad that Intel has let this be unfixed for 3/4 years in linux; that doesn't really signal deep dedication to customer safety. Have any STIBP patches been even submitted? This is not the same situation as IBRS which was mostly ignored -- there we have retpolines to protect the kernel, and it's debatable whether it's exploitable on SKL at all. Ignoring IBPB and STIBP is keeping the system plain vulnerable to user-user attacks, and us not providing users with possibiliy to easily mitigate, is a bit embarassing in my eyes. Thanks, -- Jiri Kosina SUSE Labs
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