linux-kernel - [PATCH v5 2/2] x86/speculation: Enable cross-hyperthread spectre v2 STIBP mitigation

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Date:   Mon, 10 Sep 2018 11:24:39 +0200 (CEST)
From:   Jiri Kosina <jikos@...nel.org>
To:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
        Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
        "Woodhouse, David" <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>,
        Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>,
        "Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@...el.com>
cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org
Subject: [PATCH v5 2/2] x86/speculation: Enable cross-hyperthread spectre v2
 STIBP mitigation

From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>

STIBP is a feature provided by certain Intel ucodes / CPUs. This feature
(once enabled) prevents cross-hyperthread control of decisions made by
indirect branch predictors.

Enable this feature if

- the CPU is vulnerable to spectre v2
- the CPU supports SMT and has SMT siblings online
- spectre_v2 mitigation autoselection is enabled (default)

After some previous discussion, this patch leaves STIBP on all the time,
as wrmsr on crossing kernel boundary is a no-no. This could perhaps later
be a bit more optimized (like disabling it in NOHZ, experiment with
disabling it in idle, etc) if needed.

Note that the synchronization of the mask manipulation via newly added
spec_ctrl_mutex is currently not strictly needed, as the only updater is
already being serialized by cpu_add_remove_lock, but let's make this a
little bit more future-proof.

Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 kernel/cpu.c               | 11 ++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 40bdaea97fe7..ccc5e6b7fe40 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -35,12 +35,10 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
 
-/*
- * Our boot-time value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR. We read it once so that any
- * writes to SPEC_CTRL contain whatever reserved bits have been set.
- */
-u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */
+u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex);
 
 /*
  * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in
@@ -325,6 +323,44 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 	return cmd;
 }
 
+static bool stibp_needed(void)
+{
+	if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE)
+		return false;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static void update_stibp_msr(void *info)
+{
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+}
+
+void arch_smt_update(void)
+{
+	if (stibp_needed()) {
+		u64 mask;
+		mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
+		mask = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+		if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED)
+			mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
+		else
+			mask &= ~SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
+
+		if (mask != x86_spec_ctrl_base) {
+			pr_info("Spectre v2 cross-process SMT mitigation: %s STIBP\n",
+					cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED ?
+						"Enabling" : "Disabling");
+			x86_spec_ctrl_base = mask;
+			on_each_cpu(update_stibp_msr, NULL, 1);
+		}
+		mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
+	}
+}
+
 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 {
 	enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
@@ -424,6 +460,9 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
 		pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n");
 	}
+
+	/* Enable STIBP if appropriate */
+	arch_smt_update();
 }
 
 #undef pr_fmt
diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c
index aa7fe85ad62e..4bba5071d61e 100644
--- a/kernel/cpu.c
+++ b/kernel/cpu.c
@@ -2025,6 +2025,12 @@ static void cpuhp_online_cpu_device(unsigned int cpu)
 	kobject_uevent(&dev->kobj, KOBJ_ONLINE);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Architectures that need SMT-specific errata handling during SMT hotplug
+ * should override these.
+ */
+void __weak arch_smt_update(void) { };
+
 static int cpuhp_smt_disable(enum cpuhp_smt_control ctrlval)
 {
 	int cpu, ret = 0;
@@ -2051,8 +2057,10 @@ static int cpuhp_smt_disable(enum cpuhp_smt_control ctrlval)
 		 */
 		cpuhp_offline_cpu_device(cpu);
 	}
-	if (!ret)
+	if (!ret) {
 		cpu_smt_control = ctrlval;
+		arch_smt_update();
+	}
 	cpu_maps_update_done();
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -2063,6 +2071,7 @@ static int cpuhp_smt_enable(void)
 
 	cpu_maps_update_begin();
 	cpu_smt_control = CPU_SMT_ENABLED;
+	arch_smt_update();
 	for_each_present_cpu(cpu) {
 		/* Skip online CPUs and CPUs on offline nodes */
 		if (cpu_online(cpu) || !node_online(cpu_to_node(cpu)))

-- 
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs