linux-kernel - Re: get_arg_page() && ptr

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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jL_a5B6w39Vb3S07-Epu4JGPTB5N6A75ERVOryvNeA7ZA@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Mon, 10 Sep 2018 21:27:17 -0700
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:     Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
Cc:     Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>, Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>,
        Stanislav Kozina <skozina@...hat.com>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: get_arg_page() && ptr_size accounting

On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 10:21 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com> wrote:
> On 09/10, Kees Cook wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 9:41 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>> > On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 5:29 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com> wrote:
>> >> Hi Kees,
>> >>
>> >> I was thinking about backporting the commit 98da7d08850fb8bde
>> >> ("fs/exec.c: account for argv/envp pointers"), but I am not sure
>> >> I understand it...
>>
>> BTW, if you backport that, please get the rest associated with the
>> various Stack Clash related weaknesses:
>
> may be...
>
>> da029c11e6b1 exec: Limit arg stack to at most 75% of _STK_LIM
>
> and I have to admit that I do not understand this patch at all, the
> changelog explains nothing.

The issue here is with keeping some stack space available for a
program to reasonably start execution without doing insane things. The
sizes were picked after discussion with Linus while examining the
various Stack Clash weaknesses.

> Could you explain what this patch actually prevents from? Especially
> now that we have stack_guard_gap?

One of the many Stack Clash abuses was that it was possible to jump
over the stack gap with outrageous environment variables that got
expanded in stupid ways by, IIRC, glibc or the dynamic linker. The
point here was to be defensive in the face of future weaknesses, and
try to be robust in the face of crazy execs but workable under normal
(but large) execs.

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security