linux-kernel - Re: get_arg_page() && ptr

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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jKwJx6mLV8=Z313kkZzqhikyoKwnRTQsd5X+U_gMkuS_w@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Mon, 10 Sep 2018 21:30:49 -0700
From:   Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To:     Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
Cc:     Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>, Michal Hocko <mhocko@...e.com>,
        Stanislav Kozina <skozina@...hat.com>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: get_arg_page() && ptr_size accounting

On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 10:43 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com> wrote:
> On 09/10, Oleg Nesterov wrote:
>>
>> On 09/10, Kees Cook wrote:
>> >
>> > On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 9:41 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> wrote:
>> > > On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 5:29 AM, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com> wrote:
>> > >> Hi Kees,
>> > >>
>> > >> I was thinking about backporting the commit 98da7d08850fb8bde
>> > >> ("fs/exec.c: account for argv/envp pointers"), but I am not sure
>> > >> I understand it...
>> >
>> > BTW, if you backport that, please get the rest associated with the
>> > various Stack Clash related weaknesses:
>>
>> may be...
>>
>> > da029c11e6b1 exec: Limit arg stack to at most 75% of _STK_LIM
>>
>> and I have to admit that I do not understand this patch at all, the
>> changelog explains nothing.
>>
>> Could you explain what this patch actually prevents from? Especially
>> now that we have stack_guard_gap?
>
> forgot to mention...
>
> with this patch
>
>         #define MAX_ARG_STRINGS 0x7FFFFFFF
>
> doesn't match the reality. perhaps something like below makes sense just
> to make it clear, but this is cosmetic.

Part of the discussion from back then was basically "we don't have
hard-coded limits so programs need to check dynamically themselves".

I'd prefer to leave it all well enough alone since I don't want to
introduce regressions here in the face of the many many Stack Clash
style weaknesses.

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security