linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 16/18] LSM: Allow arbitrary LSM ordering

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Message-ID: <ddb2a534-0845-55c1-329c-70adcc3847b8@schaufler-ca.com>
Date:   Mon, 17 Sep 2018 16:40:50 -0700
From:   Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>
Cc:     Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
        Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
        Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
        "Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@...el.com>,
        LSM <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        LKLM <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 16/18] LSM: Allow arbitrary LSM ordering

On 9/17/2018 4:28 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 17, 2018 at 4:26 PM, John Johansen
> <john.johansen@...onical.com> wrote:
>> On 09/17/2018 04:20 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>>> On Mon, Sep 17, 2018 at 4:10 PM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> wrote:
>>>> Landlock, because it target unprivileged users, should only be called
>>>> after all other major (access-control) LSMs. The admin or distro must
>>>> not be able to change that order in any way. This constraint doesn't
>>>> apply to current LSMs, though.
>>> Good point! It will be easy to add LSM_ORDER_LAST, though, given the
>>> machinery introduced in this series.
>>>
>> And when we have two LSMs that want to use that?
> We'll cross that bridge when we come to it, but perhaps "last
> exclusive"? (lsm.enable/disable to choose)

If we define restrictions on use of LSM_ORDER_LAST like we have
for LSM_ORDER_FIRST (only for capabilities) before anyone starts
abusing it we may be OK. Since an LSM_ORDER_LAST has to know that
it can't count on getting called (a non-last module may return -EACCES)
I don't see any way that having multiple LSM_ORDER_LAST modules in
any given order would be a real problem. Of course, a module could be
doing state management that *really* requires it be last, but that
would be a badly designed module and someone sensible would NAK it.