linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 16/18] LSM: Allow arbitrary LSM ordering

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Message-ID: <968ac661-ad5d-c6e2-1587-971b6dceaaea@digikod.net>
Date:   Tue, 18 Sep 2018 01:47:00 +0200
From:   Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
To:     Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc:     John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
        Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
        Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
        Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>,
        "Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@...el.com>,
        LSM <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        LKLM <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 16/18] LSM: Allow arbitrary LSM ordering


On 9/18/18 01:30, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 9/17/2018 4:20 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Mon, Sep 17, 2018 at 4:10 PM, Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> wrote:
>>> Landlock, because it target unprivileged users, should only be called
>>> after all other major (access-control) LSMs. The admin or distro must
>>> not be able to change that order in any way. This constraint doesn't
>>> apply to current LSMs, though.
> 
> What harm would it cause for Landlock to get called before SELinux?
> I certainly see why it seems like it ought to get called after, but
> would it really make a difference?

If an unprivileged process is able to infer some properties of a file
being requested (thanks to one of its eBPF program doing checks on this
process accesses), whereas this file access would be denied by a
privileged LSM, then there is a side channel attack allowing this
process to indirectly get information otherwise inaccessible.

In other words, an unprivileged process should not be allowed to sneak
itself (via an eBPF program) before SELinux for instance. SELinux should
be able to block such information gathering the same way it can block a
fstat(2) requested by a process.



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