linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 00/22] KEYS: Support TPM-wrapped key and crypto ops

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Date:   Tue, 18 Sep 2018 00:51:07 -0500
From:   Denis Kenzior <denkenz@...il.com>
To:     David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>
Cc:     jmorris@...ei.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/22] KEYS: Support TPM-wrapped key and crypto ops

Hi David,

> It passes it to each parser in turn till one says it can parse it.  It's not
> ideal, but it seems to work - so far.  Better would be to annotate it in some
> way.  I have considered annotating the type field so that the payload doesn't
> have to have it added:
> 
> 	keyctl padd asymmetric.x509 "" @s </tmp/foo.x509
> 	keyctl padd asymmetric.pkcs#8 ...
> 	keyctl padd asymmetric.tpm ...
> 
> However, this doesn't work with "keyctl update" or "keyctl instantiate".
> 

In theory the PEM file already contains the type of the certificate, at 
least at a high level.  E.g. private, public, tpm.  So if we accept PEM 
files directly that could be potentially a faster way of determining the 
parser to use and would still work with keyctl update/instantiate, right?

Regards,
-Denis