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Message-Id: <18a21cda-1da9-3bfb-7b34-80415b5457f9@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2018 19:40:36 -0400
From: Tony Krowiak <akrowiak@...ux.ibm.com>
To: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>,
Tony Krowiak <akrowiak@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>,
linux-s390@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc: freude@...ibm.com, schwidefsky@...ibm.com,
heiko.carstens@...ibm.com, borntraeger@...ibm.com,
cohuck@...hat.com, kwankhede@...dia.com,
bjsdjshi@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, pbonzini@...hat.com,
alex.williamson@...hat.com, pmorel@...ux.vnet.ibm.com,
alifm@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, mjrosato@...ux.vnet.ibm.com,
jjherne@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, thuth@...hat.com,
pasic@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, berrange@...hat.com,
fiuczy@...ux.vnet.ibm.com, buendgen@...ibm.com,
frankja@...ux.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 24/26] KVM: s390: device attrs to enable/disable AP
interpretation
On 09/17/2018 04:51 AM, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> Am 12.09.18 um 21:43 schrieb Tony Krowiak:
>> From: Tony Krowiak <akrowiak@...ux.ibm.com>
>>
>> Introduces two new VM crypto device attributes (KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO)
>> to enable or disable AP instruction interpretation from userspace
>> via the KVM_SET_DEVICE_ATTR ioctl:
>>
>> * The KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_ENABLE_APIE attribute enables hardware
>> interpretation of AP instructions executed on the guest.
>>
>> * The KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_DISABLE_APIE attribute disables hardware
>> interpretation of AP instructions executed on the guest. In this
>> case the instructions will be intercepted and pass through to
>> the guest.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tony Krowiak <akrowiak@...ux.ibm.com>
>> ---
>> arch/s390/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
>> arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 2 ++
>> arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
>> 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/kvm_host.h
>> index b32bd1b..36d3531 100644
>> --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/kvm_host.h
>> +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/kvm_host.h
>> @@ -719,6 +719,7 @@ struct kvm_s390_crypto {
>> __u32 crycbd;
>> __u8 aes_kw;
>> __u8 dea_kw;
>> + __u8 apie;
>> };
>>
>> #define APCB0_MASK_SIZE 1
>> diff --git a/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h b/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
>> index 8c23afc..a8dbd90 100644
>> --- a/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
>> +++ b/arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h
>> @@ -161,6 +161,8 @@ struct kvm_s390_vm_cpu_subfunc {
>> #define KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_ENABLE_DEA_KW 1
>> #define KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_DISABLE_AES_KW 2
>> #define KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_DISABLE_DEA_KW 3
>> +#define KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_ENABLE_APIE 4
>> +#define KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_DISABLE_APIE 5
>>
>> /* kvm attributes for migration mode */
>> #define KVM_S390_VM_MIGRATION_STOP 0
>> diff --git a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c
>> index 2cdd980..286c2e0 100644
>> --- a/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c
>> +++ b/arch/s390/kvm/kvm-s390.c
>> @@ -856,12 +856,11 @@ void kvm_s390_vcpu_crypto_reset_all(struct kvm *kvm)
>>
>> static int kvm_s390_vm_set_crypto(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_device_attr *attr)
>> {
>> - if (!test_kvm_facility(kvm, 76))
>> - return -EINVAL;
>> -
>> mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
>> switch (attr->attr) {
>> case KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_ENABLE_AES_KW:
>> + if (!test_kvm_facility(kvm, 76))
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> get_random_bytes(
>> kvm->arch.crypto.crycb->aes_wrapping_key_mask,
>> sizeof(kvm->arch.crypto.crycb->aes_wrapping_key_mask));
>> @@ -869,6 +868,8 @@ static int kvm_s390_vm_set_crypto(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_device_attr *attr)
>> VM_EVENT(kvm, 3, "%s", "ENABLE: AES keywrapping support");
>> break;
>> case KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_ENABLE_DEA_KW:
>> + if (!test_kvm_facility(kvm, 76))
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> get_random_bytes(
>> kvm->arch.crypto.crycb->dea_wrapping_key_mask,
>> sizeof(kvm->arch.crypto.crycb->dea_wrapping_key_mask));
>> @@ -876,17 +877,31 @@ static int kvm_s390_vm_set_crypto(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_device_attr *attr)
>> VM_EVENT(kvm, 3, "%s", "ENABLE: DEA keywrapping support");
>> break;
>> case KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_DISABLE_AES_KW:
>> + if (!test_kvm_facility(kvm, 76))
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> kvm->arch.crypto.aes_kw = 0;
>> memset(kvm->arch.crypto.crycb->aes_wrapping_key_mask, 0,
>> sizeof(kvm->arch.crypto.crycb->aes_wrapping_key_mask));
>> VM_EVENT(kvm, 3, "%s", "DISABLE: AES keywrapping support");
>> break;
>> case KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_DISABLE_DEA_KW:
>> + if (!test_kvm_facility(kvm, 76))
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> kvm->arch.crypto.dea_kw = 0;
>> memset(kvm->arch.crypto.crycb->dea_wrapping_key_mask, 0,
>> sizeof(kvm->arch.crypto.crycb->dea_wrapping_key_mask));
>> VM_EVENT(kvm, 3, "%s", "DISABLE: DEA keywrapping support");
>> break;
>> + case KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_ENABLE_APIE:
>> + if (!ap_instructions_available()) {
>> + mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
>> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>> + }
>> + kvm->arch.crypto.apie = 1;
>> + break;
>> + case KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_DISABLE_APIE:
>> + kvm->arch.crypto.apie = 0;
>> + break;
>> default:
>> mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
>> return -ENXIO;
>> @@ -1493,6 +1508,8 @@ static int kvm_s390_vm_has_attr(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_device_attr *attr)
>> case KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_ENABLE_DEA_KW:
>> case KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_DISABLE_AES_KW:
>> case KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_DISABLE_DEA_KW:
>> + case KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_ENABLE_APIE:
>> + case KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_DISABLE_APIE:
>
> As also replied to the QEMU series, could we indicate
> KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_ENABLE_APIE (and maybe
> KVM_S390_VM_CRYPTO_DISABLE_APIE) only with ap_instructions_available(),
> so we can avoid the additional KVM_S390_VM_CPU_FEAT_AP?
>
> KVM_S390_VM_CPU_FEAT_AP is right now completely unused in KVM otherwise
> (never checked, we only care about apie).
After much discussion with Halil and a few exchanges with you, we
decided to go ahead and accept your suggestion to get rid of
KVM_S390_VM_CPU_FEAT and keep the VM device attributes to enable/disable
apie.
To that end, I responded to patches 03/26, 11/26 and 25/26 with fixup!
patches that show the KVM/kernel changes that will be necessary to get
rid of KVM_S390_VM_CPU_FEAT and use apie to control ECA.28. I did that
to generate discussion in v10 rather than waiting until v11 for
comments. I make no guarantees that those fixup! patches will
successfully apply should you have a v10 branch generated from this
patch series you want to update.
>
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