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Date:   Sat, 29 Sep 2018 22:43:07 +0100
From:   Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
To:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
CC:     akpm@...ux-foundation.org, "Ingo Molnar" <mingo@...nel.org>,
        "Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        "Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>,
        "Borislav Petkov" <bp@...e.de>
Subject: [PATCH 3.16 011/131] x86/bugs/AMD: Add support to disable RDS on
 Fam[15,16,17]h if requested

3.16.59-rc1 review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>

commit 764f3c21588a059cd783c6ba0734d4db2d72822d upstream.

AMD does not need the Speculative Store Bypass mitigation to be enabled.

The parameters for this are already available and can be done via MSR
C001_1020. Each family uses a different bit in that MSR for this.

[ tglx: Expose the bit mask via a variable and move the actual MSR fiddling
  	into the bugs code as that's the right thing to do and also required
	to prepare for dynamic enable/disable ]

Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@...cle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16:
 - Renumber the feature bit
 - We don't have __ro_after_init
 - Adjust filename, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@...adent.org.uk>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h    |  1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h |  4 ++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c            | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c           | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c         |  4 ++++
 5 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h
@@ -192,6 +192,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB	(7*32+12) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */
 #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW (7*32+13) /* "" Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE (7*32+14) /* "" Disable Speculative Store Bypass. */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS	(7*32+15)  /* "" AMD RDS implementation */
 
 #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE	(7*32+29) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD (7*32+30) /* "" AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -199,6 +199,10 @@ enum ssb_mitigation {
 	SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE,
 };
 
+/* AMD specific Speculative Store Bypass MSR data */
+extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
+extern u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask;
+
 extern char __indirect_thunk_start[];
 extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
 
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <asm/apic.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 #include <asm/pci-direct.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
@@ -470,6 +471,26 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_
 		va_align.mask	  = (upperbit - 1) & PAGE_MASK;
 		va_align.flags    = ALIGN_VA_32 | ALIGN_VA_64;
 	}
+
+	if (c->x86 >= 0x15 && c->x86 <= 0x17) {
+		unsigned int bit;
+
+		switch (c->x86) {
+		case 0x15: bit = 54; break;
+		case 0x16: bit = 33; break;
+		case 0x17: bit = 10; break;
+		default: return;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Try to cache the base value so further operations can
+		 * avoid RMW. If that faults, do not enable RDS.
+		 */
+		if (!rdmsrl_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, &x86_amd_ls_cfg_base)) {
+			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RDS);
+			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS);
+			x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask = 1ULL << bit;
+		}
+	}
 }
 
 static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
@@ -780,6 +801,11 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86
 		set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_AMD_APIC_C1E);
 
 	rdmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LEVEL, &c->microcode, &dummy);
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS)) {
+		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_RDS);
+		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS);
+	}
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -40,6 +40,13 @@ static u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
  */
 static u64 x86_spec_ctrl_mask = ~SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
 
+/*
+ * AMD specific MSR info for Speculative Store Bypass control.
+ * x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask is initialized in identify_boot_cpu().
+ */
+u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
+u64 x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask;
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
 
 static double __initdata x = 4195835.0;
@@ -109,7 +116,8 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 
 	/*
 	 * Read the SPEC_CTRL MSR to account for reserved bits which may
-	 * have unknown values.
+	 * have unknown values. AMD64_LS_CFG MSR is cached in the early AMD
+	 * init code as it is not enumerated and depends on the family.
 	 */
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
 		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
@@ -216,6 +224,14 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64 gues
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host);
 
+static void x86_amd_rds_enable(void)
+{
+	u64 msrval = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | x86_amd_ls_cfg_rds_mask;
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_RDS))
+		wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msrval);
+}
+
 #ifdef RETPOLINE
 static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;
 
@@ -481,6 +497,11 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __
 
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO:
+		/*
+		 * AMD platforms by default don't need SSB mitigation.
+		 */
+		if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD)
+			break;
 	case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON:
 		mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE;
 		break;
@@ -507,6 +528,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init __
 			x86_spec_ctrl_set(SPEC_CTRL_RDS);
 			break;
 		case X86_VENDOR_AMD:
+			x86_amd_rds_enable();
 			break;
 		}
 	}
@@ -528,6 +550,9 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
 {
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
 		x86_spec_ctrl_set(x86_spec_ctrl_base & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask);
+
+	if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE)
+		x86_amd_rds_enable();
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -819,6 +819,10 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
 	{ X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR,	5,					},
 	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	5,					},
 	{ X86_VENDOR_NSC,	5,					},
+	{ X86_VENDOR_AMD,	0x12,					},
+	{ X86_VENDOR_AMD,	0x11,					},
+	{ X86_VENDOR_AMD,	0x10,					},
+	{ X86_VENDOR_AMD,	0xf,					},
 	{ X86_VENDOR_ANY,	4,					},
 	{}
 };

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