linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] iw_cxgb4: fix a missing-check bug

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <CAAa=b7fPLM-kF+VyZhhj2tzhzuFNnXpv=gPVJ2mCcfQyToew0Q@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Sat, 20 Oct 2018 18:56:02 -0500
From:   Wenwen Wang <wang6495@....edu>
To:     swise@...ngridcomputing.com
Cc:     Kangjie Lu <kjlu@....edu>, swise@...lsio.com, dledford@...hat.com,
        jgg@...pe.ca, linux-rdma@...r.kernel.org,
        open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Wenwen Wang <wang6495@....edu>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] iw_cxgb4: fix a missing-check bug

On Sat, Oct 20, 2018 at 6:41 PM Steve Wise <swise@...ngridcomputing.com> wrote:
>
> Hey Wenwen,
>
> > Subject: [PATCH] iw_cxgb4: fix a missing-check bug
> >
> > In c4iw_flush_hw_cq, the next CQE is acquired through t4_next_hw_cqe(). In
> > t4_next_hw_cqe(), the CQE, i.e., 'cq->queue[cq->cidx]', is checked to see
> > whether it is valid through t4_valid_cqe(). If it is valid, the address of
> > the CQE is then saved to 'hw_cqe'. Later on, the CQE is copied to the
> local
> > memory in create_read_req_cqe(). The problem here is that the CQE is
> > actually in a DMA region allocated by dma_alloc_coherent() in create_cq().
> > Given that the device also has the permission to access the DMA region, a
> > malicious device controlled by an attacker can modify the CQE in the DMA
> > region after the check in t4_next_hw_cqe() but before the copy in
> > create_read_req_cqe(). By doing so, the attacker can supply invalid CQE,
> > which can cause undefined behavior of the kernel and introduce potential
> > security risks.
> >
>
> If the dma device is malicious, couldn't it just dma some incorrect CQE but
> still valid in the first place?  I don't think this patch actually solves
> the issue, and it forces a copy of a 64B CQE in a critical data io path.

Thanks for your response! If the malicious dma device just dma some
incorrect CQE, it will not be able to pass the verification in
t4_valid_cqe().

Wenwen