linux-kernel - Re: RFC: userspace exception fixups

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Tue, 6 Nov 2018 11:22:05 -0800
From:   Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
To:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc:     "Christopherson, Sean J" <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Rich Felker <dalias@...c.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Jethro Beekman <jethro@...tanix.com>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
        linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, nhorman@...hat.com,
        npmccallum@...hat.com, "Ayoun, Serge" <serge.ayoun@...el.com>,
        shay.katz-zamir@...el.com, linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org,
        Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Carlos O'Donell <carlos@...hat.com>,
        adhemerval.zanella@...aro.org
Subject: Re: RFC: userspace exception fixups

On 11/6/18 11:02 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 10:41 AM Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 11/6/18 10:20 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>> I almost feel like the right solution is to call into SGX on its own
>>> private stack or maybe even its own private address space.
>>
>> Yeah, I had the same gut feeling.  Couldn't the debugger even treat the
>> enclave like its own "thread" with its own stack and its own set of
>> registers and context?  That seems like a much more workable model than
>> trying to weave it together with the EENTER context.
> 
> So maybe the API should be, roughly
> 
> sgx_exit_reason_t sgx_enter_enclave(pointer_to_enclave, struct
> host_state *state);
> sgx_exit_reason_t sgx_resume_enclave(same args);
> 
> where host_state is something like:
> 
> struct host_state {
>   unsigned long bp, sp, ax, bx, cx, dx, si, di;
> };
> 
> and the values in host_state explicitly have nothing to do with the
> actual host registers.  So, if you want to use the outcall mechanism,
> you'd allocate some memory, point sp to that memory, call
> sgx_enter_enclave(), and then read that memory to do the outcall.

Ah, so instead of the enclave rudely "hijacking" the EENTER context, we
have it nicely return and nicely _hint_ to the calling context what it
would like to do.  Then, the EENTER context can make a controlled
transition over to the requested context.

> Actually implementing this would be distinctly nontrivial, and would
> almost certainly need some degree of kernel help to avoid an explosion
> when a signal gets delivered while we have host_state.sp loaded into
> the actual SP register.  Maybe rseq could help with this?

As long as the memory pointed to by host_state.sp is valid and can hold
the signal frame (grows down without clobbering anything), what goes
boom?  The signal handling would push a signal frame and call the
handler.  It would have a shallow-looking stack, but the handler could
just do its normal business and return from the signal where the frame
would get popped and continue with %rsp=host_state.sp, blissfully
unaware of the signal ever having happened.