linux-kernel - Re: RFC: userspace exception fixups

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Date:   Tue, 6 Nov 2018 12:12:17 -0800
From:   Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
To:     Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Cc:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        "Christopherson, Sean J" <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
        Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Rich Felker <dalias@...c.org>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Jethro Beekman <jethro@...tanix.com>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,
        Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
        linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, nhorman@...hat.com,
        npmccallum@...hat.com, "Ayoun, Serge" <serge.ayoun@...el.com>,
        shay.katz-zamir@...el.com, linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org,
        Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Carlos O'Donell <carlos@...hat.com>,
        adhemerval.zanella@...aro.org
Subject: Re: RFC: userspace exception fixups



> On Nov 6, 2018, at 11:22 AM, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com> wrote:
> 
>> On 11/6/18 11:02 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>> On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 10:41 AM Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> On 11/6/18 10:20 AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>>> I almost feel like the right solution is to call into SGX on its own
>>>> private stack or maybe even its own private address space.
>>> 
>>> Yeah, I had the same gut feeling.  Couldn't the debugger even treat the
>>> enclave like its own "thread" with its own stack and its own set of
>>> registers and context?  That seems like a much more workable model than
>>> trying to weave it together with the EENTER context.
>> 
>> So maybe the API should be, roughly
>> 
>> sgx_exit_reason_t sgx_enter_enclave(pointer_to_enclave, struct
>> host_state *state);
>> sgx_exit_reason_t sgx_resume_enclave(same args);
>> 
>> where host_state is something like:
>> 
>> struct host_state {
>>  unsigned long bp, sp, ax, bx, cx, dx, si, di;
>> };
>> 
>> and the values in host_state explicitly have nothing to do with the
>> actual host registers.  So, if you want to use the outcall mechanism,
>> you'd allocate some memory, point sp to that memory, call
>> sgx_enter_enclave(), and then read that memory to do the outcall.
> 
> Ah, so instead of the enclave rudely "hijacking" the EENTER context, we
> have it nicely return and nicely _hint_ to the calling context what it
> would like to do.  Then, the EENTER context can make a controlled
> transition over to the requested context.

Exactly. And existing enclaves keep working — their rudeness is just magically translated into a hint!

> 
>> Actually implementing this would be distinctly nontrivial, and would
>> almost certainly need some degree of kernel help to avoid an explosion
>> when a signal gets delivered while we have host_state.sp loaded into
>> the actual SP register.  Maybe rseq could help with this?
> 
> As long as the memory pointed to by host_state.sp is valid and can hold
> the signal frame (grows down without clobbering anything), what goes
> boom?  The signal handling would push a signal frame and call the
> handler.  It would have a shallow-looking stack, but the handler could
> just do its normal business and return from the signal where the frame
> would get popped and continue with %rsp=host_state.sp, blissfully
> unaware of the signal ever having happened.

True, but what if we have a nasty enclave that writes to memory just below SP *before* decrementing SP?

I suspect that rseq really can be used for this with only minimal-ish modifications.  Or we could stick this in the vDSO with some appropriate fixups in the kernel.