linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v17 18/23] platform/x86: Intel SGX driver

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Message-ID: <20181120120442.GA22172@linux.intel.com>
Date:   Tue, 20 Nov 2018 14:04:42 +0200
From:   Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
To:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>
Cc:     X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>,
        Platform Driver <platform-driver-x86@...r.kernel.org>,
        linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>,
        "Christopherson, Sean J" <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,
        nhorman@...hat.com, npmccallum@...hat.com,
        "Ayoun, Serge" <serge.ayoun@...el.com>, shay.katz-zamir@...el.com,
        haitao.huang@...ux.intel.com,
        Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@...ux.intel.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        "Svahn, Kai" <kai.svahn@...el.com>, mark.shanahan@...el.com,
        Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@...el.com>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
        Darren Hart <dvhart@...radead.org>, andy@...radead.org,
        LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v17 18/23] platform/x86: Intel SGX driver

On Mon, Nov 19, 2018 at 08:59:24AM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> The idea here is that, under normal circumstances, provisioning only
> runs once, or at least only runs rarely.  So, rather than the SDK
> running provisioning whenever it feels like doing so (which is the
> current behavior, I imagine, although I haven't looked), there would
> be a privileged program, perhaps a systemd unit that runs when needed,
> that produces the key material needed for remote attestation, and
> non-root users that need attestation would get the keying material
> from the provisioning service.  And the provisioning service could
> implement its own policy.  Ideally, the service wouldn't give the
> sealed keys to users at all but would, instead, just provide the
> entire attestation service over a UNIX socket, which would make
> provisioning capabilities revocable.
> 
> Does this make sense?

Yes, it does for me at least now that you brought some context.

/Jarkko