linux-kernel - Re: [patch 01/24] x86/speculation: Update the TIF

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Message-ID: <alpine.DEB.2.21.1811212345180.1665@nanos.tec.linutronix.de>
Date:   Wed, 21 Nov 2018 23:48:41 +0100 (CET)
From:   Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
To:     Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
cc:     Linux List Kernel Mailing <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@...nel.org>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Andrew Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Jiri Kosina <jkosina@...e.cz>, thomas.lendacky@....com,
        Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>,
        Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@...hat.com>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>,
        Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>, dave.hansen@...el.com,
        Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@...el.com>,
        "Mallick, Asit K" <asit.k.mallick@...el.com>,
        "Van De Ven, Arjan" <arjan@...ux.intel.com>, jcm@...hat.com,
        longman9394@...il.com, Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        david.c.stewart@...el.com, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [patch 01/24] x86/speculation: Update the TIF_SSBD comment

On Wed, 21 Nov 2018, Linus Torvalds wrote:

> On Wed, Nov 21, 2018 at 12:28 PM Linus Torvalds
> <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote:
> >
> > Ugh. Now you're using the broken quilt thing that makes a mush of emails for me.
> 
> Reading the series in alpine makes it look fine. No testing, but each
> patch seems sensible.
> 
> And yes, triggering on seccomp makes more sense than dumpable to me.

That's what we ended up with SSBD as well. We had the same discussion before.

Btw, I really do not like the app2app wording. I'd rather go for usr2usr,
but that's kinda horrible as well. But then, all of this is horrible.

Any better ideas?

Thanks,

	tglx