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Message-ID: <20190107175229.GJ12689@magnolia>
Date: Mon, 7 Jan 2019 09:52:29 -0800
From: "Darrick J. Wong" <darrick.wong@...cle.com>
To: Su Yanjun <suyj.fnst@...fujitsu.com>
Cc: linux-xfs@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
suyanjun218@...il.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] xfs: correct statx's result_mask value
On Mon, Jan 07, 2019 at 04:53:10AM -0500, Su Yanjun wrote:
> For statx syscall, xfs return the wrong result_mask.
>
> Signed-off-by: Su Yanjun <suyj.fnst@...fujitsu.com>
> ---
> fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c | 3 +++
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c
> index f48ffd7..3811457 100644
> --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c
> +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_iops.c
> @@ -521,6 +521,9 @@ xfs_vn_getattr(
> stat->btime.tv_nsec = ip->i_d.di_crtime.t_nsec;
> }
> }
> +
> + /* Only return mask that we care */
> + stat->result_mask &= request_mask;
Why not just:
stat->result_mask = STATX_BASIC_STATS;
at the top of the function?
I don't see the need to mask off result_mask at all, since we could some
day elect to return more than what's in request_mask...
...waitaminute, are you seeing garbage in the result_mask that's
returned to userspace? I also noticed the vfs stat functions declare
"struct kstat stat;" without explicitly zeroing the structure fields,
which means (I think) that we can leak stack information if the kernel
isn't built with the stackleak plugin?
--D
>
> if (ip->i_d.di_flags & XFS_DIFLAG_IMMUTABLE)
> stat->attributes |= STATX_ATTR_IMMUTABLE;
> --
> 2.7.4
>
>
>
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