linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v5 0/2] let kexec_file_load use platform keyring to verify the kernel image

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Date:   Mon, 21 Jan 2019 18:03:43 +0800
From:   Kairui Song <kasong@...hat.com>
To:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
Cc:     David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
        jwboyer@...oraproject.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
        jmorris@...ei.org, serge@...lyn.com, bauerman@...ux.ibm.com,
        Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...gle.com>, nayna@...ux.ibm.com,
        Dave Young <dyoung@...hat.com>,
        linux-integrity <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
        kexec@...ts.infradead.org,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 0/2] let kexec_file_load use platform keyring to verify
 the kernel image

On Mon, Jan 21, 2019 at 6:00 PM Kairui Song <kasong@...hat.com> wrote:
>
> This patch series adds a .platform_trusted_keys in system_keyring as the
> reference to .platform keyring in integrity subsystem, when platform
> keyring is being initialized it will be updated, so it will be
> accessable for verifying PE signed kernel image.
>
> This patch series let kexec_file_load use platform keyring as fall
> back if it failed to verify the image against secondary keyring,
> so the actually PE signature verify process will use keys provides
> by firmware.
>
> After this patch kexec_file_load will be able to verify a signed PE
> bzImage using keys in platform keyring.
>
> Tested in a VM with locally signed kernel with pesign and imported the
> cert to EFI's MokList variable.
>
> To test this patch series on latest kernel, you need to ensure this commit
> is applied as there is an regression bug in sanity_check_segment_list():
>
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git/commit/?id=993a110319a4a60aadbd02f6defdebe048f7773b
>
> Update from V4:
>   - Drop ifdef in security/integrity/digsig.c to make code clearer
>   - Fix a potential issue, set_platform_trusted_keys should not be
>     called when keyring initialization failed
>
> Update from V3:
>   - Tweak and simplify commit message as suggested by Mimi Zohar
>
> Update from V2:
>   - Use IS_ENABLED in kexec_file_load to judge if platform_trusted_keys
>     should be used for verifying image as suggested by Mimi Zohar
>
> Update from V1:
>   - Make platform_trusted_keys static, and update commit message as suggested
>     by Mimi Zohar
>   - Always check if platform keyring is initialized before use it
>
> Kairui Song (2):
>   integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring
>   kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify
>
>  arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 13 ++++++++++---
>  certs/system_keyring.c            | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++-
>  include/keys/system_keyring.h     |  9 +++++++++
>  include/linux/verification.h      |  1 +
>  security/integrity/digsig.c       |  3 +++
>  5 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> --
> 2.20.1
>

Hi Mimi,

I've updated the patch series again and as the code changed a bit I
didn't include previous Reviewd-by / Tested-by, it worked with no
problem, could you help have a review again? Thank you.

-- 
Best Regards,
Kairui Song