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Message-Id: <c3bc9d90ed20f1b1cce916636a28f1e85af1afdc.1548953334.git.rgb@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 11:52:11 -0500
From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
To: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux-Audit Mailing List <linux-audit@...hat.com>,
Linux Security Module list
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>, Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
Subject: [PATCH ghak107 V1] audit: remove unused actx param from audit_rule_match
The audit_rule_match() struct audit_context *actx parameter is not used
by any in-tree consumers (selinux, apparmour, integrity, smack).
The audit context is an internal audit structure that should only be
accessed by audit accessor functions.
It was part of commit 03d37d25e0f9 ("LSM/Audit: Introduce > generic
Audit LSM hooks") but appears to have never been used.
Remove it.
Please see the github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/107
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
---
Passes audit-testsuite.
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 +---
include/linux/security.h | 5 ++---
kernel/auditfilter.c | 2 +-
kernel/auditsc.c | 21 ++++++++++++---------
security/apparmor/audit.c | 3 +--
security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 3 +--
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 3 +--
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 6 ++----
security/security.c | 6 ++----
security/selinux/include/audit.h | 4 +---
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 3 +--
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 +---
12 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 9a0bdf91e646..d0b5c7a05832 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1344,7 +1344,6 @@
* @field contains the field which relates to current LSM.
* @op contains the operator that will be used for matching.
* @rule points to the audit rule that will be checked against.
- * @actx points to the audit context associated with the check.
* Return 1 if secid matches the rule, 0 if it does not, -ERRNO on failure.
*
* @audit_rule_free:
@@ -1764,8 +1763,7 @@
int (*audit_rule_init)(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
void **lsmrule);
int (*audit_rule_known)(struct audit_krule *krule);
- int (*audit_rule_match)(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
- struct audit_context *actx);
+ int (*audit_rule_match)(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
void (*audit_rule_free)(void *lsmrule);
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index dbfb5a66babb..e8febec62ffb 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1674,8 +1674,7 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
- struct audit_context *actx);
+int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
#else
@@ -1692,7 +1691,7 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
}
static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule, struct audit_context *actx)
+ void *lsmrule)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 26a80a9d43a9..add360b46b38 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1355,7 +1355,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
if (f->lsm_rule) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
- f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule, NULL);
+ f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
}
break;
case AUDIT_EXE:
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 68da71001096..7d37cb1e4aef 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -631,9 +631,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
need_sid = 0;
}
result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
- f->op,
- f->lsm_rule,
- ctx);
+ f->op,
+ f->lsm_rule);
}
break;
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
@@ -647,13 +646,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
result = security_audit_rule_match(
- name->osid, f->type, f->op,
- f->lsm_rule, ctx);
+ name->osid,
+ f->type,
+ f->op,
+ f->lsm_rule);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
- if (security_audit_rule_match(n->osid, f->type,
- f->op, f->lsm_rule,
- ctx)) {
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(
+ n->osid,
+ f->type,
+ f->op,
+ f->lsm_rule)) {
++result;
break;
}
@@ -664,7 +667,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
break;
if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
f->type, f->op,
- f->lsm_rule, ctx))
+ f->lsm_rule))
++result;
}
break;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
index eeaddfe0c0fb..5a8b9cded4f2 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -225,8 +225,7 @@ int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
return 0;
}
-int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
- struct audit_context *actx)
+int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
{
struct aa_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
struct aa_label *label;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index b8c8b1066b0a..ee559bc2acb8 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -192,7 +192,6 @@ static inline int complain_error(int error)
void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule);
int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule);
int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule);
-int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
- struct audit_context *actx);
+int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule);
#endif /* __AA_AUDIT_H */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index cc12f3449a72..026163f37ba1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -307,8 +307,7 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
}
static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule,
- struct audit_context *actx)
+ void *lsmrule)
{
return -EINVAL;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 8bc8a1c8cb3f..26fa9d9723f6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -340,8 +340,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
- rule->lsm[i].rule,
- NULL);
+ rule->lsm[i].rule);
break;
case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
@@ -349,8 +348,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
- rule->lsm[i].rule,
- NULL);
+ rule->lsm[i].rule);
default:
break;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index f1b8d2587639..5f954b179a8e 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1783,11 +1783,9 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
}
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
- struct audit_context *actx)
+int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
{
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule,
- actx);
+ return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
index 1bdf973433cc..e51a81ffb8c9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
@@ -46,13 +46,11 @@
* @field: the field this rule refers to
* @op: the operater the rule uses
* @rule: pointer to the audit rule to check against
- * @actx: the audit context (can be NULL) associated with the check
*
* Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and
* -errno on failure.
*/
-int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *rule,
- struct audit_context *actx);
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *rule);
/**
* selinux_audit_rule_known - check to see if rule contains selinux fields.
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index dd44126c8d14..0b7e33f6aa59 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -3376,8 +3376,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
return 0;
}
-int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
- struct audit_context *actx)
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
{
struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
struct context *ctxt;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 430d4f35e55c..403513df42fc 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4393,13 +4393,11 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
* @field: audit rule flags given from user-space
* @op: required testing operator
* @vrule: smack internal rule presentation
- * @actx: audit context associated with the check
*
* The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of
* whether to audit or not to audit a given object.
*/
-static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
- struct audit_context *actx)
+static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
char *rule = vrule;
--
1.8.3.1
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