linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH] virtio_ring: Use DMA API if guest memory is encrypted

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Message-ID: <20190205111128-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org>
Date:   Tue, 5 Feb 2019 11:13:39 -0500
From:   "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@...hat.com>
To:     Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>
Cc:     Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Jason Wang <jasowang@...hat.com>,
        virtualization@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
        linuxppc-dev@...ts.ozlabs.org, iommu@...ts.linux-foundation.org,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        David Gibson <david@...son.dropbear.id.au>,
        Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@...ux.ibm.com>,
        Paul Mackerras <paulus@...abs.org>,
        Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>,
        Ram Pai <linuxram@...ibm.com>,
        Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe.brucker@....com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] virtio_ring: Use DMA API if guest memory is encrypted

On Tue, Feb 05, 2019 at 08:24:07AM +0100, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 04, 2019 at 04:38:21PM -0500, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > It was designed to make, when set, as many guests as we can work
> > correctly, and it seems to be successful in doing exactly that.
> > 
> > Unfortunately there could be legacy guests that do work correctly but
> > become slow. Whether trying to somehow work around that
> > can paint us into a corner where things again don't
> > work for some people is a question worth discussing.
> 
> The other problem is that some qemu machines just throw passthrough
> devices and virtio devices on the same virtual PCI(e) bus, and have a
> common IOMMU setup for the whole bus / root port / domain.  I think
> this is completely bogus, but unfortunately it is out in the field.
> 
> Given that power is one of these examples I suspect that is what
> Thiago referes to.  But in this case the answer can't be that we
> pile on hack ontop of another, but instead introduce a new qemu
> machine that separates these clearly, and make that mandatory for
> the secure guest support.

That could we one approach, assuming one exists that guests
already support.

-- 
MST