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Message-Id: <1549385244.4146.148.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 05 Feb 2019 11:47:24 -0500
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@...onical.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Jessica Yu <jeyu@...nel.org>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@...nel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Justin Forbes <jforbes@...hat.com>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/ima: require signed kernel modules
Hi Seth,
On Tue, 2019-02-05 at 09:18 -0600, Seth Forshee wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 31, 2019 at 02:18:59PM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > Require signed kernel modules on systems with secure boot mode enabled.
> >
> > To coordinate between appended kernel module signatures and IMA
> > signatures, only define an IMA MODULE_CHECK policy rule if
> > CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is not enabled.
> >
> > This patch defines a function named set_module_sig_required() and renames
> > is_module_sig_enforced() to is_module_sig_enforced_or_required(). The
> > call to set_module_sig_required() is dependent on CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY
> > being enabled.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
>
> With respect to interactions with the kernel lockdown patches, this
> looks better than the patches I saw previously. I don't feel like I know
> enough about what's going on with IMA to ack the patch, but I feel
> confident that it's at least not going to break signature enforcement
> for us.
Thank you for testing! Could this be translated into a "tested-by"
"(for w/lockdown patches)"?
Mimi
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