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Message-Id: <4ce5e057-0702-b0d5-7bb2-cea5b22e2efa@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2019 18:11:44 -0300
From: Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@...abs.org, linux-efi <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-integrity <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@...ba.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
Jeremy Kerr <jk@...abs.org>,
Matthew Garret <matthew.garret@...ula.com>,
Nayna Jain <nayna@...ux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] Enabling secure boot on PowerNV systems
On 4/2/19 4:36 PM, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 11:15 AM Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@...ux.ibm.com> wrote:
>> 1. Enable efivarfs by selecting CONFIG_EFI in the CONFIG_OPAL_SECVAR
>> introduced in this patch set. With CONFIG_EFIVAR_FS, userspace tools can
>> be used to manage the secure variables.
> efivarfs has some pretty significant behavioural semantics that
> directly reflect the EFI specification. Using it to expose non-EFI
> variable data feels like it's going to increase fragility - there's a
> risk that we'll change things in a way that makes sense for the EFI
> spec but breaks your use case. Is the desire to use efivarfs to
> maintain consistency with existing userland tooling, or just to avoid
> having a separate filesystem?
>
We want to use the efivarfs for compatibility with existing userspace
tools. We will track and match any EFI changes that affect us.
Our use case is restricted to secure boot - this is not going to be a
general purpose EFI variable implementation.
Claudio
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