[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <CACdnJusBm93zwDqTXTx_QYsg1-aGUAAHm_qq8Lcx3TvGTxdmbg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2019 14:51:14 -0700
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>
To: Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@...ux.ibm.com>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@...abs.org, linux-efi <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-integrity <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@...ba.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@...nel.crashing.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
Jeremy Kerr <jk@...abs.org>,
Matthew Garret <matthew.garret@...ula.com>,
Nayna Jain <nayna@...ux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] Enabling secure boot on PowerNV systems
On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 2:11 PM Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@...ux.ibm.com> wrote:
> We want to use the efivarfs for compatibility with existing userspace
> tools. We will track and match any EFI changes that affect us.
So you implement the full PK/KEK/db/dbx/dbt infrastructure, and
updates are signed in the same way?
> Our use case is restricted to secure boot - this is not going to be a
> general purpose EFI variable implementation.
In that case we might be better off with a generic interface for this
purpose that we can expose on all platforms that implement a secure
boot key hierarchy. Having an efivarfs that doesn't allow the creation
of arbitrary attributes may break other existing userland
expectations.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists