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Date:   Wed, 3 Apr 2019 17:50:31 +0100
From:   Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
To:     Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@....com>
Cc:     Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>,
        linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>,
        Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@...nel.org>,
        Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@....com>,
        Chintan Pandya <cpandya@...eaurora.org>,
        Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
        Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@....com>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
        Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
        Evgeniy Stepanov <eugenis@...gle.com>,
        Graeme Barnes <Graeme.Barnes@....com>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
        Jacob Bramley <Jacob.Bramley@....com>,
        Kate Stewart <kstewart@...uxfoundation.org>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>,
        Kostya Serebryany <kcc@...gle.com>,
        Lee Smith <Lee.Smith@....com>,
        Luc Van Oostenryck <luc.vanoostenryck@...il.com>,
        Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Ramana Radhakrishnan <Ramana.Radhakrishnan@....com>,
        Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@....com>,
        Ruben Ayrapetyan <Ruben.Ayrapetyan@....com>,
        Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
        Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
        Szabolcs Nagy <Szabolcs.Nagy@....com>,
        Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/4] arm64: Define Documentation/arm64/elf_at_flags.txt

On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 03:52:49PM +0000, Kevin Brodsky wrote:
> On 18/03/2019 16:35, Vincenzo Frascino wrote:
> > +2. Features exposed via AT_FLAGS
> > +--------------------------------
> > +
> > +bit[0]: ARM64_AT_FLAGS_SYSCALL_TBI
> > +
> > +    On arm64 the TCR_EL1.TBI0 bit has been always enabled on the arm64
> > +    kernel, hence the userspace (EL0) is allowed to set a non-zero value
> > +    in the top byte but the resulting pointers are not allowed at the
> > +    user-kernel syscall ABI boundary.
> > +    When bit[0] is set to 1 the kernel is advertising to the userspace
> > +    that a relaxed ABI is supported hence this type of pointers are now
> > +    allowed to be passed to the syscalls, when these pointers are in
> > +    memory ranges privately owned by a process and obtained by the
> > +    process in accordance with the definition of "valid tagged pointer"
> > +    in paragraph 3.
> > +    In these cases the tag is preserved as the pointer goes through the
> > +    kernel. Only when the kernel needs to check if a pointer is coming
> > +    from userspace an untag operation is required.
> 
> I would leave this last sentence out, because:
> 1. It is an implementation detail that doesn't impact this user ABI.
> 2. It is not entirely accurate: untagging the pointer may be needed for
> various kinds of address lookup (like finding the corresponding VMA), at
> which point the kernel usually already knows it is a userspace pointer.

I fully agree, the above paragraph should not be part of the user ABI
document.

> > +3. ARM64_AT_FLAGS_SYSCALL_TBI
> > +-----------------------------
> > +
> > +From the kernel syscall interface prospective, we define, for the purposes
> > +of this document, a "valid tagged pointer" as a pointer that either it has
> > +a zero value set in the top byte or it has a non-zero value, it is in memory
> > +ranges privately owned by a userspace process and it is obtained in one of
> > +the following ways:
> > +  - mmap() done by the process itself, where either:
> > +    * flags = MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS
> > +    * flags = MAP_PRIVATE and the file descriptor refers to a regular
> > +      file or "/dev/zero"
> > +  - a mapping below sbrk(0) done by the process itself
> 
> I don't think that's very clear, this doesn't say how the mapping is
> obtained. Maybe "a mapping obtained by the process using brk() or sbrk()"?

I think what we mean here is anything in the "[heap]" section as per
/proc/*/maps (in the kernel this would be start_brk to brk).

> > +  - any memory mapped by the kernel in the process's address space during
> > +    creation and following the restrictions presented above (i.e. data, bss,
> > +    stack).
> 
> With the rules above, the code section is included as well. Replacing "i.e."
> with "e.g." would avoid having to list every single section (which is
> probably not a good idea anyway).

We could mention [stack] explicitly as that's documented in the
Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt and it's likely considered ABI
already.

The code section is MAP_PRIVATE, and can be done by the dynamic loader
(user process), so it falls under the mmap() rules listed above. I guess
we could simply drop "done by the process itself" here and allow
MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS or MAP_PRIVATE of regular file. This would
cover the [heap] and [stack] and we won't have to debate the brk() case
at all.

We probably mention somewhere (or we should in the tagged pointers doc)
that we don't support tagged PC.

-- 
Catalin

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