linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v6 09/10] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass

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Message-ID: <20190403165005.GA17500@fuggles.cambridge.arm.com>
Date:   Wed, 3 Apr 2019 17:50:05 +0100
From:   Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>
To:     Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@....com>
Cc:     linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, catalin.marinas@....com,
        marc.zyngier@....com, suzuki.poulose@....com, Dave.Martin@....com,
        shankerd@...eaurora.org, julien.thierry@....com,
        mlangsdo@...hat.com, stefan.wahren@....com, Andre.Przywara@....com,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@...e.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 09/10] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for
 speculative store bypass

Hi Jeremy,

On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 06:05:56PM -0500, Jeremy Linton wrote:
> Return status based on ssbd_state and the arm64 SSBS feature. If
> the mitigation is disabled, or the firmware isn't responding then
> return the expected machine state based on a new blacklist of known
> vulnerable cores.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@....com>
> Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@....com>
> Tested-by: Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@...e.com>
> ---
>  arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 44 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> index 6958dcdabf7d..172ffbabd597 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
> @@ -278,6 +278,7 @@ static int detect_harden_bp_fw(void)
>  DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required);
>  
>  int ssbd_state __read_mostly = ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL;
> +static bool __ssb_safe = true;
>  
>  static const struct ssbd_options {
>  	const char	*str;
> @@ -386,6 +387,9 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
>  
>  	WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
>  
> +	if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), entry->midr_range_list))
> +		__ssb_safe = false;
> +

Does this mean that we assume that CPUs not present in our table are not
affected by speculative store bypass? I don't think that's a good
assumption, because we don't necessary have knowledge about partner or
future CPU implementations, so I think any CPU lists really have to be
whitelists like they are for the other vulnerabilities.

>  	if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_SSBS)) {
>  		required = false;
>  		goto out_printmsg;
> @@ -419,12 +423,14 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
>  		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
>  		return false;
>  
> +	/* machines with mixed mitigation requirements must not return this */
>  	case SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED:
>  		pr_info_once("%s mitigation not required\n", entry->desc);
>  		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED;
>  		return false;
>  
>  	case SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS:
> +		__ssb_safe = false;
>  		required = true;
>  		break;
>  
> @@ -474,6 +480,16 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
>  	return required;
>  }
>  
> +/* known vulnerable cores */
> +static const struct midr_range arm64_ssb_cpus[] = {
> +	MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57),
> +	MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72),
> +	MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73),
> +	MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A75),
> +	MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A76),
> +	{},
> +};
> +
>  static void __maybe_unused
>  cpu_enable_cache_maint_trap(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
>  {
> @@ -769,6 +785,7 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = {
>  		.capability = ARM64_SSBD,
>  		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
>  		.matches = has_ssbd_mitigation,
> +		.midr_range_list = arm64_ssb_cpus,
>  	},
>  #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1188873
>  	{
> @@ -807,3 +824,30 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
>  
>  	return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
>  }
> +
> +ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev,
> +		struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
> +{
> +	/*
> +	 *  Two assumptions: First, ssbd_state reflects the worse case
> +	 *  for heterogeneous machines, and that if SSBS is supported its
> +	 *  supported by all cores.
> +	 */
> +	switch (ssbd_state) {
> +	case ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED:
> +		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
> +
> +	case ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL:
> +	case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE:
> +		if (cpus_have_cap(ARM64_SSBS))
> +			return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
> +		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD))
> +			return sprintf(buf,
> +			    "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled\n");

x86 has a message about the prctl(), which we also support.

Will