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Message-ID: <20190325122247.5zyinkqmixmqg425@mbp>
Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2019 12:22:47 +0000
From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
To: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@....com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, will.deacon@....com,
marc.zyngier@....com, suzuki.poulose@....com, Dave.Martin@....com,
shankerd@...eaurora.org, julien.thierry@....com,
mlangsdo@...hat.com, stefan.wahren@....com, Andre.Przywara@....com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 00/10] arm64: add system vulnerability sysfs entries
On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 06:05:47PM -0500, Jeremy Linton wrote:
> Arm64 machines should be displaying a human readable
> vulnerability status to speculative execution attacks in
> /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
>
> This series enables that behavior by providing the expected
> functions. Those functions expose the cpu errata and feature
> states, as well as whether firmware is responding appropriately
> to display the overall machine status. This means that in a
> heterogeneous machine we will only claim the machine is mitigated
> or safe if we are confident all booted cores are safe or
> mitigated.
>
> v5->v6:
> Invert meltdown logic to display that a core is safe rather
> than mitigated if the mitigation has been enabled on
> machines that are safe. This can happen when the
> mitigation was forced on via command line or KASLR.
> This means that in order to detect if kpti is enabled
> other methods must be used (look at dmesg) when the
> machine isn't itself susceptible to meltdown.
> Trivial whitespace tweaks.
The v6 logic looks fine to me. For the whole series:
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>
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