linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] security: Create "kernel hardening" config area

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Date:   Mon, 15 Apr 2019 19:44:09 +0300
From:   Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>
To:     Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
        Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@...ionext.com>,
        James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Cc:     Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@...gle.com>,
        Kostya Serebryany <kcc@...gle.com>,
        Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
        Sandeep Patil <sspatil@...roid.com>,
        Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>,
        Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
        Michal Marek <michal.lkml@...kovi.net>,
        Emese Revfy <re.emese@...il.com>,
        "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
        linux-kbuild@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] security: Create "kernel hardening" config area

On 11.04.2019 21:01, Kees Cook wrote:
> Right now kernel hardening options are scattered around various Kconfig
> files. This can be a central place to collect these kinds of options
> going forward. This is initially populated with the memory initialization
> options from the gcc-plugins.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>

Hello Kees, hello everyone!

After applying this series the kernel config looks like that:

...
...
CONFIG_LSM="yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor"

#
# Kernel hardening options
#

#
# Memory initialization
#
CONFIG_INIT_STACK_NONE=y
# CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_USER is not set
# CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF is not set
# CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL is not set
# CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK is not set
CONFIG_CRYPTO=y

#
# Crypto core or helper
#
CONFIG_CRYPTO_ALGAPI=y
...
...

What do you think about some separator between memory initialization options and
CONFIG_CRYPTO?

Best regards,
Alexander