linux-kernel - [tip:x86/irq] x86/irq/64: Remap the IRQ stack with guard pages

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Message-ID: <tip-18b7a6bef62de1d598fbff23b52114b7775ecf00@git.kernel.org>
Date:   Wed, 17 Apr 2019 07:22:54 -0700
From:   tip-bot for Andy Lutomirski <tipbot@...or.com>
To:     linux-tip-commits@...r.kernel.org
Cc:     bp@...e.de, hpa@...or.com, mingo@...hat.com, luto@...nel.org,
        nstange@...e.de, mingo@...nel.org, x86@...nel.org,
        sean.j.christopherson@...el.com, tglx@...utronix.de,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, jpoimboe@...hat.com
Subject: [tip:x86/irq] x86/irq/64: Remap the IRQ stack with guard pages

Commit-ID:  18b7a6bef62de1d598fbff23b52114b7775ecf00
Gitweb:     https://git.kernel.org/tip/18b7a6bef62de1d598fbff23b52114b7775ecf00
Author:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
AuthorDate: Sun, 14 Apr 2019 18:00:07 +0200
Committer:  Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
CommitDate: Wed, 17 Apr 2019 15:40:57 +0200

x86/irq/64: Remap the IRQ stack with guard pages

The IRQ stack lives in percpu space, so an IRQ handler that overflows it
will overwrite other data structures.

Use vmap() to remap the IRQ stack so that it will have the usual guard
pages that vmap()/vmalloc() allocations have. With this, the kernel will
panic immediately on an IRQ stack overflow.

[ tglx: Move the map code to a proper place and invoke it only when a CPU
  	is about to be brought online. No point in installing the map at
  	early boot for all possible CPUs. Fail the CPU bringup if the vmap()
  	fails as done for all other preparatory stages in CPU hotplug. ]

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@...e.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>
Cc: Nicolai Stange <nstange@...e.de>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@...nel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190414160146.363733568@linutronix.de
---
 arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c
index c0f89d136b80..f107eb2021f6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/irq_64.c
@@ -91,6 +91,35 @@ bool handle_irq(struct irq_desc *desc, struct pt_regs *regs)
 	return true;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
+/*
+ * VMAP the backing store with guard pages
+ */
+static int map_irq_stack(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+	char *stack = (char *)per_cpu_ptr(&irq_stack_backing_store, cpu);
+	struct page *pages[IRQ_STACK_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE];
+	void *va;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < IRQ_STACK_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE; i++) {
+		phys_addr_t pa = per_cpu_ptr_to_phys(stack + (i << PAGE_SHIFT));
+
+		pages[i] = pfn_to_page(pa >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+	}
+
+	va = vmap(pages, IRQ_STACK_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL, PAGE_KERNEL);
+	if (!va)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	per_cpu(hardirq_stack_ptr, cpu) = va + IRQ_STACK_SIZE;
+	return 0;
+}
+#else
+/*
+ * If VMAP stacks are disabled due to KASAN, just use the per cpu
+ * backing store without guard pages.
+ */
 static int map_irq_stack(unsigned int cpu)
 {
 	void *va = per_cpu_ptr(&irq_stack_backing_store, cpu);
@@ -98,6 +127,7 @@ static int map_irq_stack(unsigned int cpu)
 	per_cpu(hardirq_stack_ptr, cpu) = va + IRQ_STACK_SIZE;
 	return 0;
 }
+#endif
 
 int irq_init_percpu_irqstack(unsigned int cpu)
 {