linux-kernel - Re: [RFC][PATCH 2/5] mips/atomic: Fix loongson_llsc

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Date:   Wed, 24 Apr 2019 21:18:04 +0000
From:   Paul Burton <paul.burton@...s.com>
To:     Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
CC:     "stern@...land.harvard.edu" <stern@...land.harvard.edu>,
        "akiyks@...il.com" <akiyks@...il.com>,
        "andrea.parri@...rulasolutions.com" 
        <andrea.parri@...rulasolutions.com>,
        "boqun.feng@...il.com" <boqun.feng@...il.com>,
        "dlustig@...dia.com" <dlustig@...dia.com>,
        "dhowells@...hat.com" <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        "j.alglave@....ac.uk" <j.alglave@....ac.uk>,
        "luc.maranget@...ia.fr" <luc.maranget@...ia.fr>,
        "npiggin@...il.com" <npiggin@...il.com>,
        "paulmck@...ux.ibm.com" <paulmck@...ux.ibm.com>,
        "will.deacon@....com" <will.deacon@....com>,
        "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        "torvalds@...ux-foundation.org" <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Huacai Chen <chenhc@...ote.com>,
        Huang Pei <huangpei@...ngson.cn>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 2/5] mips/atomic: Fix loongson_llsc_mb() wreckage

Hi Peter,

On Wed, Apr 24, 2019 at 02:36:58PM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> The comment describing the loongson_llsc_mb() reorder case doesn't
> make any sense what so ever. Instruction re-ordering is not an SMP
> artifact, but rather a CPU local phenomenon. This means that _every_
> LL/SC loop needs this barrier right in front to avoid the CPU from
> leaking a memop inside it.

Does it?

The Loongson bug being described here causes an sc to succeed
erroneously if certain loads or stores are executed between the ll &
associated sc, including speculatively. On a UP system there's no code
running on other cores to race with us & cause our sc to fail - ie. sc
should always succeed anyway, so if the bug hits & the sc succeeds
what's the big deal? It would have succeeded anyway. At least that's my
understanding based on discussions with Loongson engineers a while ago.

Having said that, if you have a strong preference for adding the barrier
in UP systems anyway then I don't really object. It's not like anyone's
likely to want to run a UP kernel on the affected systems, nevermind
care about a miniscule performance impact.

One possibility your change could benefit would be if someone ran Linux
on a subset of cores & some non-Linux code on other cores, in which case
there could be something to cause the sc to fail. I've no idea if that's
something these Loongson systems ever do though.

> For the branch speculation case; if futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic()
> needs one at the bne branch target, then surely the normal
> __cmpxch_asmg() implementation does too. We cannot rely on the

s/cmpxch_asmg/cmpxchg_asm/

> barriers from cmpxchg() because cmpxchg_local() is implemented with
> the same macro, and branch prediction and speculation are, too, CPU
> local.

Similar story - cmpxchg_local() ought not have have CPUs racing for
access to the memory in question. Having said that I don't know the
details of when Loongson clears LLBit (ie. causes an sc to fail), so if
it does that on based upon access to memory at a larger granularity than
the 32b or 64b value being operated on then that could be a problem so
I'm pretty happy with adding these barriers.

Thanks,
    Paul