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Message-ID: <20190426162425.GI4608@zn.tnic>
Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2019 18:24:25 +0200
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: Gary R Hook <ghook@....com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
"Hook, Gary" <Gary.Hook@....com>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
"peterz@...radead.org" <peterz@...radead.org>,
"x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>,
"mingo@...hat.com" <mingo@...hat.com>,
"luto@...nel.org" <luto@...nel.org>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/mm/mem_encrypt: Disable all instrumentation for SME
early boot code
On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 03:11:17PM +0000, Gary R Hook wrote:
> 2) Turn off instrumentation for lib/cmdline.c. The risk is that any
> changes to its code would not enjoy the benefits of KASAN/etc testing
> (if enabled).
What happened to Thomas' suggestion to turn off instrumentation for
those files only when CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=y?
Which is a variant of 2) above with ifdeffery.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
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