linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH 0/7] x86: introduce system calls addess space isolation

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Date:   Sun, 28 Apr 2019 09:08:27 +0300
From:   Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>
To:     Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>
Cc:     linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
        Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@...cle.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
        Jonathan Adams <jwadams@...gle.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Paul Turner <pjt@...gle.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, linux-mm@...ck.org,
        linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/7] x86: introduce system calls addess space
 isolation

On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 07:41:09AM -0700, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 4/25/19 2:45 PM, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> > The idea behind the prevention is that if we fault in pages in the
> > execution path, we can compare target address against the kernel symbol
> > table.  So if we're in a function, we allow local jumps (and simply falling
> > of the end of a page) but if we're jumping to a new function it must be to
> > an external label in the symbol table.  Since ROP attacks are all about
> > jumping to gadget code which is effectively in the middle of real
> > functions, the jumps they induce are to code that doesn't have an external
> > symbol, so it should mostly detect when they happen.
> 
> This turns the problem from: "attackers can leverage any data/code that
> the kernel has mapped (anything)" to "attackers can leverage any
> code/data that the current syscall has faulted in".
> 
> That seems like a pretty restrictive change.
> 
> > At this time we are not suggesting any API that will enable the system
> > calls isolation. Because of the overhead required for this, it should only
> > be activated for processes or containers we know should be untrusted. We
> > still have no actual numbers, but surely forcing page faults during system
> > call execution will not come for free.
> 
> What's the minimum number of faults that have to occur to handle the
> simplest dummy fault?
 
For the current implementation it's 3.

Here is the example trace of #PF's produced by a dummy get_answer
system call from patch 7:

[   12.012906] #PF: DATA: do_syscall_64+0x26b/0x4c0 fault at 0xffffffff82000bb8
[   12.012918] #PF: INSN: __x86_indirect_thunk_rax+0x0/0x20 fault at __x86_indirect_thunk_rax+0x0/0x20
[   12.012929] #PF: INSN: __x64_sys_get_answer+0x0/0x10 fault at__x64_sys_get_answer+0x0/0x10

For the sci_write_dmesg syscall that does copy_from_user() and printk() its
between 35 and 60 depending on console and /proc/sys/kernel/printk values.

This includes both code and data accesses. The data page faults can be
avoided if we pre-populate SCI page tables with data.

-- 
Sincerely yours,
Mike.