Message-Id: <20190428060109.GE14896@rapoport-lnx>
Date:   Sun, 28 Apr 2019 09:01:10 +0300
From:   Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com>
To:     Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
Cc:     LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@...cle.com>,
        Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
        Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
        James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>,
        Jonathan Adams <jwadams@...gle.com>,
        Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Paul Turner <pjt@...gle.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
        Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>,
        LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/7] x86: introduce system calls addess space
 isolation

On Thu, Apr 25, 2019 at 05:30:13PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 25, 2019 at 2:46 PM Mike Rapoport <rppt@...ux.ibm.com> wrote:
> >
> > Hi,
> >
> > Address space isolation has been used to protect the kernel from the
> > userspace and userspace programs from each other since the invention of the
> > virtual memory.
> >
> > Assuming that kernel bugs and therefore vulnerabilities are inevitable it
> > might be worth isolating parts of the kernel to minimize damage that these
> > vulnerabilities can cause.
> >
> > The idea here is to allow an untrusted user access to a potentially
> > vulnerable kernel in such a way that any kernel vulnerability they find to
> > exploit is either prevented or the consequences confined to their isolated
> > address space such that the compromise attempt has minimal impact on other
> > tenants or the protected structures of the monolithic kernel.  Although we
> > hope to prevent many classes of attack, the first target we're looking at
> > is ROP gadget protection.
> >
> > These patches implement a "system call isolation (SCI)" mechanism that
> > allows running system calls in an isolated address space with reduced page
> > tables to prevent ROP attacks.
> >
> > ROP attacks involve corrupting the stack return address to repoint it to a
> > segment of code you know exists in the kernel that can be used to perform
> > the action you need to exploit the system.
> >
> > The idea behind the prevention is that if we fault in pages in the
> > execution path, we can compare target address against the kernel symbol
> > table.  So if we're in a function, we allow local jumps (and simply falling
> > of the end of a page) but if we're jumping to a new function it must be to
> > an external label in the symbol table.
> 
> That's quite an assumption.  The entry code at least uses .L labels.
> Do you get that right?
> 
> As far as I can see, most of what's going on here has very little to
> do with jumps and calls.  The benefit seems to come from making sure
> that the RET instruction actually goes somewhere that's already been
> faulted in.  Am I understanding right?

Well, RET indeed will go somewhere that's already been faulted in. But
before that, the first CALL to not-yet-mapped code will fault and bring in
the page containing the CALL target.

If the CALL is made into a middle of a function, SCI will refuse to
continue the syscall execution.

As for the local jumps, as long as they are inside a page that was already
mapped or the next page, they are allowed.

This does not take care (yet) of larger functions where local jumps are
further then PAGE_SIZE.

Here's an example trace of #PF's produced by a dummy get_answer system call
from patch 7:

[   12.012906] #PF: DATA: do_syscall_64+0x26b/0x4c0 fault at 0xffffffff82000bb8
[   12.012918] #PF: INSN: __x86_indirect_thunk_rax+0x0/0x20 fault at __x86_indirect_thunk_rax+0x0/0x20
[   12.012929] #PF: INSN: __x64_sys_get_answer+0x0/0x10 fault at __x64_sys_get_answer+0x0/0x10
 
> --Andy
> 

-- 
Sincerely yours,
Mike.

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