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Message-ID: <18357.1559753807@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
Date: Wed, 05 Jun 2019 17:56:47 +0100
From: David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Cc: dhowells@...hat.com, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, raven@...maw.net,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
linux-block@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Rational model for UID based controls
Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com> wrote:
> YES!
I'm trying to decide if that's fervour or irritation at this point ;-)
> And it would be really great if you put some thought into what
> a rational model would be for UID based controls, too.
I have put some thought into it, but I don't see a single rational model. It
depends very much on the situation.
In any case, that's what I was referring to when I said I might need to call
inode_permission(). But UIDs don't exist for all filesystems, for example,
and there are no UIDs on superblocks, mount objects or hardware events.
Now, I could see that you ignore UIDs on things like keys and
hardware-triggered events, but how does this interact with things like mount
watches that see directories that have UIDs?
Are you advocating making it such that process B can only see events triggered
by process A if they have the same UID, for example?
David
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