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Date:   Wed, 5 Jun 2019 09:04:09 -0700
From:   Andy Lutomirski <>
To:     Casey Schaufler <>
Cc:     David Howells <>,
        Andy Lutomirski <>,
        Al Viro <>,,
        Linux FS Devel <>,
        Linux API <>,,,
        LSM List <>,
        LKML <>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/8] Mount, FS, Block and Keyrings notifications [ver #2]

On Wed, Jun 5, 2019 at 7:51 AM Casey Schaufler <> wrote:
> On 6/5/2019 1:41 AM, David Howells wrote:
> > Casey Schaufler <> wrote:
> >
> >> I will try to explain the problem once again. If process A
> >> sends a signal (writes information) to process B the kernel
> >> checks that either process A has the same UID as process B
> >> or that process A has privilege to override that policy.
> >> Process B is passive in this access control decision, while
> >> process A is active. In the event delivery case, process A
> >> does something (e.g. modifies a keyring) that generates an
> >> event, which is then sent to process B's event buffer.
> > I think this might be the core sticking point here.  It looks like two
> > different situations:
> >
> >  (1) A explicitly sends event to B (eg. signalling, sendmsg, etc.)
> >
> >  (2) A implicitly and unknowingly sends event to B as a side effect of some
> >      other action (eg. B has a watch for the event A did).
> >
> > The LSM treats them as the same: that is B must have MAC authorisation to send
> > a message to A.
> YES!
> Threat is about what you can do, not what you intend to do.
> And it would be really great if you put some thought into what
> a rational model would be for UID based controls, too.
> > But there are problems with not sending the event:
> >
> >  (1) B's internal state is then corrupt (or, at least, unknowingly invalid).
> Then B is a badly written program.

Either I'm misunderstanding you or I strongly disagree.  If B has
authority to detect a certain action, and A has authority to perform
that action, then refusing to notify B because B is somehow missing
some special authorization to be notified by A is nuts.  This is just
introducing incorrectness into the design in support of a
not-actually-helpful security idea.

If I can read /proc/self/mounts, I can detect changes to my mount
namespace.  Giving me a faster and nicer way to do this is fine, AS
LONG AS IT ACTUALLY WORKS.  "Works" means it needs to detect all

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