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Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.21.1906280411370.18880@namei.org>
Date: Fri, 28 Jun 2019 04:14:30 +1000 (AEST)
From: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>
cc: LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
Jiri Bohac <jbohac@...e.cz>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, kexec@...ts.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH V34 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel
is locked down
On Thu, 27 Jun 2019, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> By that metric, on a secure boot system how do we determine that code
> running in the firmware environment wasn't compromised before it
> launched the initial signed kernel?
Remote attestation tied to a hardware root of trust, before allowing
access to any further resources.
--
James Morris
<jmorris@...ei.org>
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