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Message-ID: <CACdnJuvRtQWFknzxLwKc6erCBZ3+6tXmabEdRuXXGTGrYEAp6w@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 27 Jun 2019 16:17:46 -0700
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>
To: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Cc: LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
Jiri Bohac <jbohac@...e.cz>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, kexec@...ts.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH V34 09/29] kexec_file: Restrict at runtime if the kernel
is locked down
On Thu, Jun 27, 2019 at 11:14 AM James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org> wrote:
>
> On Thu, 27 Jun 2019, Matthew Garrett wrote:
>
> > By that metric, on a secure boot system how do we determine that code
> > running in the firmware environment wasn't compromised before it
> > launched the initial signed kernel?
>
> Remote attestation tied to a hardware root of trust, before allowing
> access to any further resources.
If you use IMA you can get the same guarantees over kexec.
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