linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH ghak90 V6 02/10] audit: add container id

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <CAHC9VhTYV02ws3QcezER5cY+Xt+tExcJEO-dumTDx=FXGFh3nw@mail.gmail.com>
Date:   Thu, 18 Jul 2019 17:52:58 -0400
From:   Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To:     Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com>
Cc:     "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
        Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>,
        containers@...ts.linux-foundation.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org,
        Linux-Audit Mailing List <linux-audit@...hat.com>,
        linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        netdev@...r.kernel.org, netfilter-devel@...r.kernel.org,
        sgrubb@...hat.com, omosnace@...hat.com, dhowells@...hat.com,
        simo@...hat.com, Eric Paris <eparis@...isplace.org>,
        ebiederm@...ssion.com, nhorman@...driver.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH ghak90 V6 02/10] audit: add container id

On Wed, Jul 17, 2019 at 8:52 PM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@...hat.com> wrote:
> On 2019-07-16 19:30, Paul Moore wrote:

...

> > We can trust capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL) for enforcing audit container
> > ID policy, we can not trust ns_capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL).
>
> Ok.  So does a process in a non-init user namespace have two (or more)
> sets of capabilities stored in creds, one in the init_user_ns, and one
> in current_user_ns?  Or does it get stripped of all its capabilities in
> init_user_ns once it has its own set in current_user_ns?  If the former,
> then we can use capable().  If the latter, we need another mechanism, as
> you have suggested might be needed.

Unfortunately I think the problem is that ultimately we need to allow
any container orchestrator that has been given privileges to manage
the audit container ID to also grant that privilege to any of the
child process/containers it manages.  I don't believe we can do that
with capabilities based on the code I've looked at, and the
discussions I've had, but if you find a way I would leave to hear it.

> If some random unprivileged user wants to fire up a container
> orchestrator/engine in his own user namespace, then audit needs to be
> namespaced.  Can we safely discard this scenario for now?

I think the only time we want to allow a container orchestrator to
manage the audit container ID is if it has been granted that privilege
by someone who has that privilege already.  In the zero-container, or
single-level of containers, case this is relatively easy, and we can
accomplish it using CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL as the privilege.  If we start
nesting container orchestrators it becomes more complicated as we need
to be able to support granting and inheriting this privilege in a
manner; this is why I suggested a new mechanism *may* be necessary.

--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com