linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] arm64: kasan: fix phys_to_virt() false positive on tag-based kasan

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Message-ID: <1566224517.9993.6.camel@mtksdccf07>
Date:   Mon, 19 Aug 2019 22:21:57 +0800
From:   Walter Wu <walter-zh.wu@...iatek.com>
To:     Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>
CC:     Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>,
        Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
        Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
        Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
        "Will Deacon" <will.deacon@....com>,
        Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@...il.com>,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>,
        <wsd_upstream@...iatek.com>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
        <kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>, <linux-mediatek@...ts.infradead.org>,
        <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] arm64: kasan: fix phys_to_virt() false positive on
 tag-based kasan

On Mon, 2019-08-19 at 17:06 +0300, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
> 
> On 8/19/19 4:34 PM, Will Deacon wrote:
> > On Mon, Aug 19, 2019 at 02:23:48PM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> >> On Mon, Aug 19, 2019 at 01:56:26PM +0100, Will Deacon wrote:
> >>> On Mon, Aug 19, 2019 at 07:44:20PM +0800, Walter Wu wrote:
> >>>> __arm_v7s_unmap() call iopte_deref() to translate pyh_to_virt address,
> >>>> but it will modify pointer tag into 0xff, so there is a false positive.
> >>>>
> >>>> When enable tag-based kasan, phys_to_virt() function need to rewrite
> >>>> its original pointer tag in order to avoid kasan report an incorrect
> >>>> memory corruption.
> >>>
> >>> Hmm. Which tree did you see this on? We've recently queued a load of fixes
> >>> in this area, but I /thought/ they were only needed after the support for
> >>> 52-bit virtual addressing in the kernel.
> >>
> >> I'm seeing similar issues in the virtio blk code (splat below), atop of
> >> the arm64 for-next/core branch. I think this is a latent issue, and
> >> people are only just starting to test with KASAN_SW_TAGS.
> >>
> >> It looks like the virtio blk code will round-trip a SLUB-allocated pointer from
> >> virt->page->virt, losing the per-object tag in the process.
> >>
> >> Our page_to_virt() seems to get a per-page tag, but this only makes
> >> sense if you're dealing with the page allocator, rather than something
> >> like SLUB which carves a page into smaller objects giving each object a
> >> distinct tag.
> >>
> >> Any round-trip of a pointer from SLUB is going to lose the per-object
> >> tag.
> > 
> > Urgh, I wonder how this is supposed to work?
> > 
> 
> We supposed to ignore pointers with 0xff tags. We do ignore them when memory access checked,
> but not in kfree() path.
> This untested patch should fix the issue:
> 
> 
> 
> ---
>  mm/kasan/common.c | 2 +-
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
> index 895dc5e2b3d5..0a81cc328049 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/common.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
> @@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ static inline bool shadow_invalid(u8 tag, s8 shadow_byte)
>  		return shadow_byte < 0 ||
>  			shadow_byte >= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
>  	else
> -		return tag != (u8)shadow_byte;
> +		return (tag != KASAN_TAG_KERNEL) && (tag != (u8)shadow_byte);
>  }
>  
>  static bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,


Hi, Andrey,

Does it miss the double-free case after ignore pointer tag 0xff ?
and please help review my another patch about memory corruption
identification.

Thanks your respondence

Walter