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Message-ID: <c7c7668e-6336-0367-42b3-2f6026c466dd@fb.com>
Date: Wed, 11 Sep 2019 07:42:39 +0000
From: Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>
To: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@...gle.com>
CC: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Martin Lau <kafai@...com>,
Song Liu <songliubraving@...com>,
"netdev@...r.kernel.org" <netdev@...r.kernel.org>,
"bpf@...r.kernel.org" <bpf@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@...hat.com>,
Björn Töpel <bjorn.topel@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] bpf: validate bpf_func when BPF_JIT is enabled
On 9/10/19 6:22 PM, Sami Tolvanen wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 10, 2019 at 08:37:19AM +0000, Yonghong Song wrote:
>> You did not mention BPF_BINARY_HEADER_MAGIC and added member
>> of `magic` in bpf_binary_header. Could you add some details
>> on what is the purpose for this `magic` member?
>
> Sure, I'll add a description to the next version.
>
> The magic is a random number used to identify bpf_binary_header in
> memory. The purpose of this patch is to limit the possible call
> targets for the function pointer and checking for the magic helps
> ensure we are jumping to a page that contains a jited function,
> instead of allowing calls to arbitrary targets.
>
> This is particularly useful when combined with the compiler-based
> Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) mitigation, which Google started shipping
> in Pixel kernels last year. The compiler injects checks to all
> indirect calls, but cannot obviously validate jumps to dynamically
> generated code.
>
>>> +unsigned int bpf_call_func(const struct bpf_prog *prog, const void *ctx)
>>> +{
>>> + const struct bpf_binary_header *hdr = bpf_jit_binary_hdr(prog);
>>> +
>>> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON) && !prog->jited)
>>> + return prog->bpf_func(ctx, prog->insnsi);
>>> +
>>> + if (unlikely(hdr->magic != BPF_BINARY_HEADER_MAGIC ||
>>> + !arch_bpf_jit_check_func(prog))) {
>>> + WARN(1, "attempt to jump to an invalid address");
>>> + return 0;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + return prog->bpf_func(ctx, prog->insnsi);
>>> +}
>
>> The above can be rewritten as
>> if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON) || prog->jited ||
>> hdr->magic != BPF_BINARY_HEADER_MAGIC ||
>> !arch_bpf_jit_check_func(prog))) {
>> WARN(1, "attempt to jump to an invalid address");
>> return 0;
>> }
>
> That doesn't look quite equivalent, but yes, this can be rewritten as a
Indeed, I made a mistake. Your below change is correct.
> single if statement like this:
>
> if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON) ||
> prog->jited) &&
> (hdr->magic != BPF_BINARY_HEADER_MAGIC ||
> !arch_bpf_jit_check_func(prog)))
>
> I think splitting the interpreter and JIT paths would be more readable,
> but I can certainly change this if you prefer.
How about this:
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON) && !prog->jited)
goto out;
if (unlikely(hdr->magic != BPF_BINARY_HEADER_MAGIC ||
!arch_bpf_jit_check_func(prog))) {
WARN(1, "attempt to jump to an invalid address");
return 0;
}
out:
return prog->bpf_func(ctx, prog->insnsi);
>
>> BPF_PROG_RUN() will be called during xdp fast path.
>> Have you measured how much slowdown the above change could
>> cost for the performance?
>
> I have not measured the overhead, but it shouldn't be significant. Is
> there a particular benchmark you'd like me to run?
I am not an expert in XDP testing. Toke, Björn, could you give some
suggestions what to test for XDP performance here?
>
> Sami
>
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