linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] KEYS: asym_tpm: Switch to get_random

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Message-ID: <20191004183003.GD6945@linux.intel.com>
Date:   Fri, 4 Oct 2019 21:30:03 +0300
From:   Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>
To:     "Safford, David (GE Global Research, US)" <david.safford@...com>
Cc:     Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        "Wiseman, Monty (GE Global Research, US)" <monty.wiseman@...com>,
        "linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org" <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>,
        "stable@...r.kernel.org" <stable@...r.kernel.org>,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        "open list:ASYMMETRIC KEYS" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
        "open list:CRYPTO API" <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
        open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KEYS: asym_tpm: Switch to get_random_bytes()

> > There are many good reasons for wanting the keys to be based on the
> > TPM generator.  As the source for the kernel random number generator
> > itself says, some systems lack good randomness at startup, and systems
> > should preserve and reload the pool across shutdown and startup.
> > There are use cases for trusted keys which need to generate keys 
> > before such scripts have run. Also, in some use cases, we need to show
> > that trusted keys are FIPS compliant, which is possible with TPM
> > generated keys.
> 
> If you are able to call tpm_get_random(), the driver has already
> registered TPN as hwrng. With this solution you fail to follow the
> principle of defense in depth. If the TPM random number generator
> is compromissed (has a bug) using the entropy pool will decrease
> the collateral damage.

I.e. you make everything depend on single point of failure instead
of multiple (e.g. rdrand, TPM, whatnot).

/Jarkko