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Date:   Fri, 4 Oct 2019 11:33:42 -0700
From:   Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@...hat.com>
To:     James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senPartnership.com>
Cc:     Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@...ux.intel.com>,
        Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
        David Safford <david.safford@...com>,
        linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org,
        David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
        Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
        "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
        "open list:ASYMMETRIC KEYS" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>,
        "open list:CRYPTO API" <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>,
        open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KEYS: asym_tpm: Switch to get_random_bytes()

On Fri Oct 04 19, James Bottomley wrote:
>On Fri, 2019-10-04 at 21:22 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
>> On Thu, Oct 03, 2019 at 04:59:37PM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
>> > I think the principle of using multiple RNG sources for strong keys
>> > is a sound one, so could I propose a compromise:  We have a tpm
>> > subsystem random number generator that, when asked for <n> random
>> > bytes first extracts <n> bytes from the TPM RNG and places it into
>> > the kernel entropy pool and then asks for <n> random bytes from the
>> > kernel RNG? That way, it will always have the entropy to satisfy
>> > the request and in the worst case, where the kernel has picked up
>> > no other entropy sources at all it will be equivalent to what we
>> > have now (single entropy source) but usually it will be a much
>> > better mixed entropy source.
>>
>> I think we should rely the existing architecture where TPM is
>> contributing to the entropy pool as hwrng.
>
>That doesn't seem to work: when I trace what happens I see us inject 32
>bytes of entropy at boot time, but never again.  I think the problem is
>the kernel entropy pool is push not pull and we have no triggering
>event in the TPM to get us to push.  I suppose we could set a timer to
>do this or perhaps there is a pull hook and we haven't wired it up
>correctly?
>
>James
>

Shouldn't hwrng_fillfn be pulling from it?

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