[<prev] [next>] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <dfa331c00881d61c8ee51577a082d8bebd61805c.camel@perches.com>
Date: Sat, 26 Oct 2019 12:46:08 -0700
From: Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Dan Carpenter <error27@...il.com>,
Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@...6.fr>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Subject: [PATCH] kernel: sys.c: Avoid copying possible padding bytes in
copy_to_user
Initialization is not guaranteed to zero padding bytes so
use an explicit memset instead to avoid leaking any kernel
content in any possible padding bytes.
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>
---
kernel/sys.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index a611d1..3459a5 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -1279,11 +1279,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uname, struct old_utsname __user *, name)
SYSCALL_DEFINE1(olduname, struct oldold_utsname __user *, name)
{
- struct oldold_utsname tmp = {};
+ struct oldold_utsname tmp;
if (!name)
return -EFAULT;
+ memset(&tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
+
down_read(&uts_sem);
memcpy(&tmp.sysname, &utsname()->sysname, __OLD_UTS_LEN);
memcpy(&tmp.nodename, &utsname()->nodename, __OLD_UTS_LEN);
Powered by blists - more mailing lists